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ABSTRACT 
 
The Psychological Need for Safety at Work: 
A Cybernetic Perspective. (May 2012) 
Jeremy Mark Beus, B. S., Brigham Young University – Idaho;  
M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Stephanie C. Payne 
 
Despite an increased understanding of the individual and contextual factors that 
influence both employee safety behavior and workplace safety incidents (e.g., injuries, 
accidents), there has been surprisingly little theoretical or empirical consideration of the 
individual employee’s psychological experience of safety at work. Given that feeling 
safe is widely theorized to be a basic psychological need with implications for individual 
well-being and safety-related work behavior, the purpose of this dissertation was to use 
cybernetic theory—a conceptual framework that explains self-regulation through 
negative feedback processes—to explore both the antecedents and outcomes of 
individuals’ perceived safety at work. Theory-based hypotheses were tested in a field 
sample of 595 production employees and their foremen at three weapons production 
sites in the southern United States. Results revealed that psychological safety climate 
and perceived job risk were both meaningful correlates of workers’ perceived safety 
whereas personality variables (i.e., trait anxiety, safety locus of control) and personal 
safety knowledge were not meaningful correlates. Consistent with cybernetic theory, 
 iv 
lower perceived safety was associated with increased safety-related anxiety. However, 
contrary to theoretical expectations, safety-related anxiety did not share consistent, 
positive associations with self- or foreman-rated safety behaviors. There was limited 
support, however, which suggested that safety-related anxiety is positively associated 
with self-reported safety participation behaviors. The implications of these findings in 
conjunction with a number of explorative analyses are discussed and recommendations 
for future research are provided. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 It is well known that the breach of workplace safety can have drastic individual 
and organizational consequences. This point is easily illustrated when considering that in 
the United States alone in 2010, there were 3.06 million reported injuries and more than 
4,500 workplace fatalities (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). In addition, the economic 
cost of workers’ compensation was estimated to be greater than $50 billion in 2009 
(Liberty Mutual Research Institute for Safety, 2011), and this does not take into account 
the costs of replacing injured workers or the costs associated with a damaged 
organizational reputation (e.g., Deepwater Horizon; Macalister, 2010).  
Although recent meta-analyses evidence an ever-increasing understanding of 
many of the individual (e.g., personality traits, job attitudes) and contextual factors (e.g., 
safety climate, job characteristics) that affect both safety behavior and safety incidents 
(e.g., Beus, Payne, Bergman, & Arthur, 2010; Burke et al., 2011; Christian, Bradley, 
Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Hofmann, 2011), we still have little to 
no understanding of the psychological meaning of safety to the individual worker. That 
is, despite knowledge of factors that influence important safety outcomes, we scarcely 
understand what it means psychologically for the individual employee when the need for 
safety is (un)met at work and what implications this has for subsequent employee well-
being and safety-related work behaviors. Indeed, even scholarly books and chapters that 
have been devoted to the psychology of workplace safety (e.g., Barling & Frone, 2003;  
____________ 
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Geller, 2001; Kaplan & Tetrick, 2010) have hardly, if at all, broached the subject of what 
safety means from the individual’s perspective. Consequently, this study contributes to 
the extant occupational safety literature by exploring the implications of what it means to 
feel (un)safe at work. Specifically, using cybernetic theory (cf. Edwards, 1992; Miller, 
1965) as a conceptual framework, this study examines the individual and contextual 
factors that inform perceived safety as well as the mechanisms through which perceived 
safety is posited to affect worker well-being and safety-related work behaviors. The 
examination of this intuitively simple construct addresses a striking omission in the 
occupational safety literature and brings a needed focus to individual workers and their 
subjective experience of safety.  
This dissertation is organized as follows. First, before addressing the subjective 
experience of perceived safety, objective or actual safety is discussed—this is a 
phenomenon that is generally left undefined and unscrutinized but is important for a 
basal understanding of perceived safety. Second, perceived safety is introduced as an 
appraisal of need fulfillment. Cybernetic theory is then used to explain both how 
workers’ perceived safety is formed and what implications perceived safety has for 
worker well-being and safety-related work behavior. Finally, the method, results, and 
implications of a field study designed to investigate these phenomena is discussed. 
Actual Safety 
Safety is almost universally left undefined in the organizational sciences and 
elsewhere. Although perhaps colloquially understood, a formal definition of what safety 
is offers needed theoretical clarity that is prerequisite to examining perceived safety. As 
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a lay definition of the construct, safety can simply be described as a state of freedom 
from harm or danger (Dictionary.com, 2010). It is noteworthy that safety is not merely 
the absence of harm, but the freedom from harm. Whereas the former is a necessary 
precondition to the latter, the apparent absence of current harm does not preclude future 
harm. Reason’s (1990; 2000) Swiss cheese model of accident causation explains why 
this is true and, consequently, why safety cannot be inferred from the absence of 
incidents.  
In his model, Reason (1990; 2000) likened an organization’s defensive barriers 
against safety incidents to slices of Swiss cheese. Like the cheese, each of an 
organization’s defensive barriers has holes, or weaknesses. These holes are posited to 
have two primary causes: active failures and latent conditions. Active failures are unsafe 
acts which directly affect a barrier’s defenses, whereas latent conditions are the 
weaknesses inherent within an organization (Reason, 2000). Generally, for safety-related 
incidents such as accidents or injuries to occur, active failures and latent conditions must 
coincide (i.e., the “cheese holes” must align). However, because this alignment is often 
rare and at times due to a combination of factors that are not immediately transparent or 
known (Hulin & Rousseau, 1980; Jacobs, 1970; Reason, 2000), accidents and injuries 
often do not occur in conjunction with unsafe behaviors or faulty organizational 
safeguards. Thus, the absence of accidents, injuries, and other explicit evidences of 
breached safety are deficient as indicators of safety. Their absence does not accurately 
signify the presence of safety, or freedom from future harm; rather, accidents and 
injuries can only indicate the absence of safety (Tarrants, 1970) and imperfectly so given 
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that unsafe behavior and accidents usually do not co-occur (Reason, 1990; 1995). 
Conversely, although potentially positive indicators such as safety behavior or safety 
climate can denote the presence of safety to some degree, these factors are also deficient 
in that they are unlikely to fully represent the extent to which an individual or workplace 
is free from future harm. 
In sum, actual safety is characterized by both the absence of harm and the extent 
to which an individual or workplace is free from future harm. However, because the 
myriad threats and contributors to workers’ safety are impossible to comprehensively 
identify in any given workplace and for every individual worker (Jermier, Gaines, & 
McIntosh, 1989; McLain, 1995), direct estimates of objective or actual safety are 
infeasible; thus, the presence of safety must be inferred indirectly (Jacobs, 1970; Reason, 
1995). Furthermore, although actual safety represents the extent to which a worker is 
truly free from harm, it is a person’s perceived safety, not the true state per se, that has 
psychological and behavioral implications. Consequently, this study’s focus is on safety 
as it is perceived by the individual worker. 
Perceived Safety 
If actual safety is the extent to which individuals are truly free from harm or 
danger, perceived safety represents individuals’ subjective appraisals of the same. That 
is, perceived safety is the extent to which individuals perceive that their need to be free 
from harm is satisfied. Although it is unarguable that being safe is a basic physiological 
need given its necessity for prolonged survival, feeling safe is widely theorized to be a 
basic psychological need as well (Higgins, 2000; Maslow, 1943; Pittman & Zeigler, 
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2007; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997). Given that people are inherently 
aware of their need for physical safety (Pittman & Zeigler, 2007; Pyszczynski et al., 
1997), there is likewise a psychological need to perceive that the physical need for safety 
is being fulfilled. Feeling safe, regardless of whether it is objectively true, is vital for 
psychological well-being because it represents individuals’ evaluations of their 
likelihood for continued health or survival. Considering the perception of being safe as a 
need is consistent with Deci and Ryan’s (2000) definition of needs as “innate 
psychological nutriments that are essential for ongoing psychological growth, integrity, 
and well-being” (p. 229).  
A number of diverse motivational theories have posited perceived safety to be a 
basic psychological need. For example, in Maslow’s (1943) well-known need hierarchy 
theory, safety is a basal need, secondary only to immediate physiological needs such as 
food, water, and oxygen. In Higgins’ (2000) regulatory focus theory, individual self-
regulation is posited to differ based on whether it is serving the fundamental needs of 
nurturance (i.e., development or growth) or security (i.e., safety and protection). Based 
on this theory, a focus on the need for safety and security (i.e., a prevention focus) 
motivates behaviors that are directed towards avoiding mismatches to the desired end-
state of feeling safe (Higgins, 1997; 1998). Additionally, terror management theory 
posits the need for self-preservation (i.e., safety) to be the overarching human motive 
from which most other psychological needs are derived (Pyszczynski et al., 1997). In 
sum, these varied motivational theories underscore the importance of considering 
perceived safety as a basic psychological need. 
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A person’s perceived safety should vary based on context. That is, a person is 
likely to have differing safety perceptions at home, at work, while traveling, in a dark 
alley, and so on. These perceptions would also be expected to vary within contexts to 
some extent such that at work, a person may feel safer performing certain tasks over 
others, or working with some coworkers relative to others. However, these within-
context instances in which safety varies should inform more meaningful, overarching 
appraisals of safety given the general human tendency toward cognitive frugality and 
heuristic judgments (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). For the purposes of this study, perceived safety is examined 
as an overall appraisal at work, or the extent to which individuals believe they are 
generally free from harm in their workplace. Given the prominent role work plays in 
most individuals’ lives, perceived safety at work should have important implications for 
individuals’ well-being and safety-related work behaviors. 
What Perceived Safety is Not 
Because of the conceptual ambiguity and inconsistency that exists in much of the 
extant occupational safety literature (Christian et al., 2009), it is important to distinguish 
perceived safety from a number of other safety-related constructs. Explicating what 
perceived safety is not is valuable for both concurrent and future conceptual coherence. 
Accordingly, I describe how perceived safety is different from the related constructs of 
perceived risk, perceived job risk, psychological safety climate, and safety attitudes. 
 Perceived risk (at work). Based on conceptual similarity, the most noteworthy 
construct to differentiate perceived safety from is perceived risk. Morrow and Crum 
7 
 
(1998) described perceived risk simply as perceived dangerousness. More commonly, 
however, perceived risk is conceptualized as individuals’ subjective estimates of their 
likelihood of being harmed in a particular activity or their likelihood of experiencing an 
adverse event (e.g., Johnson & Tversky, 1983; McLain, 1995; Weinstein, 2000). Thus, 
whereas perceived safety is the extent to which individuals believe they are free from 
harm, perceived risk is essentially the extent to which individuals believe they are likely 
to be harmed. Based on these definitions, perceived safety and perceived risk seem to be 
approximate conceptual opposites, although some have claimed otherwise. For example, 
Rochlin (1999) asserted that safety is a positive construct and not simply the opposite of 
risk. Thinking of perceived risk as a measure of the potential for error, Rochlin 
contended that “defining an organization as safe because it has a low rate of error or 
accident has the same limitations as defining health in terms of not being sick” (Rochlin, 
1999, p. 1555). Just as an individual who lacks an illness is not necessarily healthy, a 
lack of risk does not inevitably guarantee the presence of safety. This suggests that 
perceived safety and perceived risk are not simply opposites on the same pole. 
Nevertheless, even if perceived risk is the conceptual opposite of perceived safety, it has 
not been measured as the empirical opposite in the organizational sciences. A 
consideration of how perceived risk has been confounded with perceived job risk 
illustrates this point.  
Perceived job risk. Often confused with perceived risk, and likewise distinct 
from perceived safety, is perceived job risk. Although not always labeled distinctly from 
perceived risk, perceived job risk is an individual’s appraisal of the level of riskiness 
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inherent to their job, and not necessarily the level of risk they personally feel when 
working. The few safety-specific studies on perceived risk that have been conducted in 
the organizational sciences have actually used items that assess perceived job risk, not 
perceived risk, or the extent to which individuals truly feel they are at risk when at work 
(e.g., Jermier et al., 1989; Morrow & Crum, 1998). For example, items from Jermier et 
al. (1989) include “I encounter personally hazardous situations while at work” and “my 
job is physically dangerous” (p. 22). Individuals who perform inherently risky or 
dangerous work (e.g., firefighters, police officers, high-rise construction workers) would 
naturally be expected to agree with these statements. However, it is entirely possible for 
these same individuals also to feel safe (or not at risk) when working despite known 
risks because the necessary safeguards have been accounted for. For example, if a 
firefighter knows he has a teammate tethered to him while he enters a smoke-filled 
building, he may feel safe (from a relative standpoint) despite the surrounding dangers. 
Likewise, a construction worker who trusts the reliability of the harnesses and equipment 
that prevent falls may feel safe even when working at great heights. These illustrations 
underscore the needed distinction between perceived safety (and perceived risk at work) 
and perceived job risk. It is important to note, however, that this conceptual distinction 
does not imply that there is no association between perceived safety and perceived job 
risk. On the contrary, as I discuss in more detail later, perceived job risk should be a 
meaningful antecedent of perceived safety. Certainly individuals are expected to use 
what they know about the riskiness of their work environment to form their own 
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appraisal of the extent to which they are free from harm. Thus, although distinct, it is 
noteworthy that these two constructs remain theoretically related. 
 Psychological safety climate. Psychological safety climate is an individual’s 
perception of workplace safety policies, procedures, and practices (Ostroff, Kinicki, & 
Tamkins, 2003; Zohar, 2003). It can more generally be considered an individual’s 
appraisal of safety’s priority in the organization (Zohar, 2000). The key difference 
between this construct and perceived safety is that psychological safety climate is an 
individual’s appraisal of the extent to which safety is prioritized by external constituents 
(e.g., supervisors, coworkers), whereas perceived safety is an internalized appraisal of 
the extent to which the basic need for safety is being satisfied. Like perceived job risk, 
psychological safety climate should be a meaningful antecedent that informs perceptions 
of safety. However, although related, these two constructs are theoretically distinct and 
should be considered separately. 
 Safety attitudes. Henning et al. (2009) described safety attitudes as beliefs 
individuals hold pertaining to safety. Example items used to assess this construct include 
“working safely should be a condition of employment” and “companies should be as 
concerned for safety as for profit” (Henning et al., 2009, p. 341). Thus, rather than an 
appraisal of feeling (un)safe, safety attitudes reflect opinions regarding how safety ought 
to be considered or handled.  
 In sum, because none of the aforementioned constructs represents a direct 
appraisal of the fulfillment of the psychological need for safety at work, it is important 
that they be treated separately both conceptually and empirically from perceived safety. 
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These distinctions were outlined to ensure future conceptual clarity with regard to 
perceived safety. Next, I discuss how cybernetic theory provides a conceptual 
framework for considering both how perceived safety is informed at work and what 
implications perceived safety has for individual well-being and behavior. 
Cybernetic Theory as a Framework for Understanding Perceived Safety 
 The premise of cybernetic, or control theory (Carver & Scheier, 1982), is that 
living organisms are self-regulating systems that are motivated to maintain desired states 
of equilibrium or homeostasis (Cummings & Cooper, 1979; Edwards, 1992; Miller, 
1965). In order to achieve equilibrium, where deviations from desired states are 
minimized, individuals use a process of negative feedback to self-regulate (Cummings & 
Cooper, 1979). In negative feedback, relevant information is gathered to allow 
individuals to compare a current state with a desired state; when a discrepancy is 
detected, actions are taken to eliminate the discrepancy which then leads to re-evaluation 
of the current state relative to the desired state. The process then repeats itself until 
equilibrium is ultimately attained (Edwards, 1992). Cybernetic theory has been posited 
to have wide explanatory power for human behavior, both in general (Carver & Scheier, 
1982; Miller, 1965) and in work or organizational contexts specifically (Cummings & 
Cooper, 1979; Edwards, 1992). Although never explicitly considered with regard to 
perceived safety, the cybernetic process has clear application when considering both 
how safety perceptions are formed and what implications those perceptions have for 
well-being and behavior.  
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In considering the cybernetic process applied to safety, there are a number of 
theoretical assumptions that should be addressed (cf. Cummings & Cooper, 1979). First, 
cybernetic theory assumes that we prefer one state (safety) over another (the lack 
thereof). Although the degree of safety one individual prefers relative to another is likely 
to differ, safety is ultimately a basic need that should be sought by all at some level 
(Maslow, 1943; Pittman & Zeigler, 2007; Pyszczynski et al., 1997). Second, this 
framework assumes that we have knowledge of our current state or that we are capable 
of judging our current level of safety. It is important to note that this does not assume 
that “knowledge” of our current safety is accurate—rather, that we are capable of 
reaching a judgment (accurate or otherwise) of our current level. The third assumption is 
that we can compare our current and desired states. This assumption is tightly yoked 
with the previous as perception of one’s current state has little meaning unless that 
current state is considered relative to a desired state (Carver & Scheier, 1982). Fourth, 
cybernetic theory assumes that perceived discrepancies are psychologically troubling—it 
is noteworthy that this is only expected to be the case when the discrepancy is 
considered important (Edwards, 1992). This assumption is deemed appropriate for 
perceived safety given its role as a basic psychological need. Finally, cybernetic theory 
assumes that discrepancy-induced strain will motivate individuals to adopt strategies to 
eliminate the discrepancies (Cummings & Cooper, 1979; Edwards, 1992).  
 Operating under these assumptions, cybernetic theory should be able to explain 
how individuals self-regulate with regard to their perceived safety at work. To add 
greater specificity to the cybernetic explanation of perceived safety, specific contextual 
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and individual factors that should inform perceived safety were considered, as well as 
perceived safety’s influence on safety-related anxiety and subsequent safety-related 
work behaviors. Figure 1 provides a graphic illustration of the cybernetic process applied 
to perceived safety and provides a basic framework outlining the major variables 
considered in this study. 
 
 
Figure 1. Cybernetic theory applied to perceived safety. 
 
Contextual Antecedents of Perceived Safety 
 Individuals are theorized to gather relevant contextual information from cues 
around them to form their perceived safety at work. Because safety constitutes both the 
lack of current harm and the freedom from future harm, individuals are expected to use 
the accessible information that allows them to infer both. Thus, workers should use 
direct evidence of breached safety (e.g., injuries) as well as other indicators concerning 
the likelihood of future freedom from harm (e.g., psychological safety climate) as the 
bases of their perceived safety at work. The contextual factors that are hypothesized to 
13 
 
inform individuals’ perceived safety at work are delineated in the subsections that 
follow. 
Knowledge of workplace injuries. Arguably the most salient evidence of 
breached safety at work is the occurrence of an injury. A workplace incident that results 
in personal injury clearly demonstrates at least a temporary lack of safety. Such 
incidents, even when relatively isolated, should decrease workers’ perceived safety 
given that they plainly show that there is a possibility of being harmed. More regular or 
systematic occurrences of such incidents should only serve to further decrease perceived 
safety as they suggest a lesser degree of freedom from harm. Although the personal 
experience of being injured is likely the most meaningful evidence of breached safety, 
learning about or witnessing co-workers’ injuries, whether through formal channels 
(e.g., organizational announcements) or informal ones (e.g., hearsay), should likewise 
lessen perceived safety. Even without personal involvement, the knowledge that others 
have been harmed while at work represents meaningful contextual information that 
should influence perceived safety. Thus, knowledge of workplace injuries, whether 
gained through personal experience or observation or whether learned of indirectly, 
should be negatively associated with perceived safety such that more known injuries are 
associated with lower perceived safety.  
Hypothesis 1: Knowledge of workplace injuries, whether experienced, witnessed, 
or learned, is negatively related to perceived safety in the workplace. 
Perceived job risk. As discussed, perceived job risk is an appraisal of the risk or 
danger inherent to the conduct of work or the physical environment in which the work is 
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conducted. Whereas knowledge of injuries can be used to infer a current or recent lack 
of safety, perceived job risk can be used to infer the likelihood of future injury, or a 
future lack of safety on the job. Even when no known injuries have occurred in recent 
history, a person’s perceived job risk, born of industry and job knowledge, personal 
experience, and social influence processes (Burke et al., 2011), should be instrumental in 
helping workers to formulate a reasonable estimation regarding their current safety. 
Thus, perceived job risk and perceived safety should be negatively associated such that 
workers who perceive greater levels of job risk should also have lower perceived safety. 
Hypothesis 2: Perceived job risk is negatively related to perceived safety in the 
workplace. 
Psychological safety climate. Like the perceived riskiness inherent to the 
conduct of work or the environment in which the work is performed, psychological 
safety climate constitutes a context-based perception that should inform individuals’ 
perceived safety. Psychological safety climate, a worker’s appraisal of the extent to 
which safety is valued and prioritized by both management and fellow coworkers, is 
formed through interactions with supervisors and coworkers and by observing whether 
safety-related behaviors are supported or reinforced (Ostroff et al., 2003; Zohar, 2003). 
The extent to which workers perceive that safety is supported and reinforced by their 
workgroup or organization should likewise communicate to them the extent to which 
they will be free from harm in the future. Indeed, the negative association between safety 
climate and subsequent injuries that has been demonstrated meta-analytically (Beus et 
al., 2010) suggests that psychological safety climates are reasonable predictors of future 
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safety, or a lack thereof. Consequently, I posit that psychological safety climate is 
positively associated with perceived safety such that more favorable psychological 
safety climates are associated with greater perceived safety.  
Hypothesis 3: Psychological safety climate is positively related to perceived 
safety in the workplace. 
Person-Related Antecedents of Perceived Safety 
 Whereas workers are expected to use the above-mentioned contextual cues to 
form their perceptions of safety, there are individual differences that theoretically should 
affect perceived safety largely independent of the surrounding context. A number of 
individual differences have demonstrated meaningful associations with safety-related 
behavior and outcomes (e.g., conscientiousness, emotional stability; Christian et al., 
2009; Clarke & Robertson, 2005). Likewise, there are person-related factors that 
theoretically should affect individuals’ perceived safety. Individual differences relevant 
to perceived safety that have demonstrated direct application to past occupational safety 
research include trait anxiety (a key facet of emotional stability; Goldberg, 1992; 
McCrae & Costa, 1987), locus of control, and safety knowledge (e.g., Christian et al., 
2009; Matthews & MacLeod, 1985). These constructs are considered for the purposes of 
this study because of their proximal theoretical relevance to perceived safety and 
because they have established nomological networks (cf. Bruk-Lee, Khoury, Nixon, 
Goh, & Spector, 2009; Christian et al., 2009; Judge & Bono, 2001; Wang, Bowling, & 
Eschleman, 2010) that can help position perceived safety within a broader constellation 
of constructs. This is of particular value given that this study represents an initial 
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examination of the perceived safety construct. Consequently, trait anxiety, locus of 
control, and safety knowledge are discussed in turn to address their distinctive 
theoretical contributions to perceived safety.   
 Trait anxiety. Trait anxiety, or a generalized tendency toward feeling 
apprehensive, worried, or fearful, is a component of the more expansive trait of 
emotional stability (Goldberg, 1992; McCrae & Costa, 1987) which has demonstrated 
meaningful meta-analytic associations with workplace accidents and injuries (Christian 
et al., 2009; Clarke & Robertson, 2005). A predisposition towards anxiety has direct 
implications for perceived safety given that feeling apprehensive or worried is naturally 
at odds with feeling safe. Indeed, past research has shown that generalized anxiety leads 
to greater sensitivity to threat cues such that more anxious individuals are more likely to 
selectively attend to potential threats or dangers in their environment (Gallagher, 1990; 
Mathews & MacLeod, 1985). A greater preoccupation with threats to personal safety in 
the workplace should likewise reduce perceived safety. Thus, independent of contextual 
factors, trait anxiety should be negatively related to perceived safety such that 
individuals higher in trait anxiety will tend to have lower perceived safety at work 
relative to individuals lower in trait anxiety. 
Hypothesis 4: Trait anxiety is negatively related to perceived safety in the 
workplace. 
 Locus of control. Locus of control reflects the extent to which people tend to 
believe that the events in their lives are personally controlled (i.e., contingent upon their 
own behaviors) versus being controlled by external forces such as luck, fate, or powerful 
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others (Rotter, 1966). Belief in personal control over life events characterizes an internal 
locus of control, whereas a belief that events are controlled by outside forces 
characterizes an external locus of control (Rotter, 1966). Locus of control is 
conceptualized as a hierarchical construct with general locus of control existing at the 
highest level and domain or context-specific loci of control residing at lower hierarchical 
levels (Chen, Goddard, & Casper, 2004; Rotter, 1975; Wang et al., 2010). Examples of 
domain-specific loci of control include work locus of control (e.g., Wang et al., 2010), 
health locus of control (e.g., Wallston, Wallston, Kaplan, & Maides, 1976), driving locus 
of control (Montag & Comrey, 1987), and safety locus of control (e.g., Jones & 
Wuebker, 1985). Because the focus of this study is workplace safety, safety locus of 
control will be considered here, as opposed to general locus of control. In support of this, 
Jones and Wuebker (1993) found only a moderate association between general and 
safety locus of control, suggesting that safety locus of control may have unique 
explanatory power relative to general locus of control.  
Past research has shown that safety locus of control is associated with both safety 
behavior and the occurrence and severity of accidents and injuries (Christian et al., 2009; 
Jones & Wuebker, 1985; 1993). These studies suggest that individuals with an internal 
safety locus of control tend to work more safely and are involved in fewer and less 
severe accidents and injuries relative to individuals with an external safety locus of 
control (Christian et al., 2009; Jones & Wuebker, 1985). Workers’ safety locus of 
control should influence their perceived safety given that a person who believes they 
have control over workplace safety is likely to feel safer due to greater confidence that 
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events (or non-events) are contingent upon their behaviors. That is, individuals with an 
internal safety locus of control are more likely to believe that maintaining personal 
safety is within their power. Conversely, individuals with an external safety locus of 
control who believe workplace accidents or injuries are beyond their control should feel 
more susceptible to harm and thus have lower perceived safety. Accordingly, safety 
locus of control should be positively related to perceived safety such that greater safety 
locus of control (i.e., a more internal locus) is associated with greater perceived safety.  
Hypothesis 5: Safety locus of control is positively related to perceived safety in 
the workplace. 
Safety knowledge. Although trait anxiety and safety locus of control should both 
exert largely unconscious influences on workers’ perceived safety, safety knowledge 
represents workers’ conscious appraisal of the extent to which they know how to remain 
free from harm at work. Building off of Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, and Sager’s (1993) 
theory concerning the three determinants of general job performance, Griffin and Neal 
(2000) posited that safety knowledge, in addition to skill and motivation, should likewise 
be a primary determinant of safety performance. Naturally, individuals can only work as 
safely as they know how to—although they may be motivated to work safely, they will 
be unable to if they are uninformed on the means of doing so. Knowing how to be safe at 
work thus has direct implications for workers’ perceived safety. Workers who are aware 
that they lack the knowledge to follow all necessary safety protocol or use certain 
protective equipment should feel less safe given their reduced understanding of how to 
avoid or prevent future harm at work. Consequently, safety knowledge and perceived 
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safety should be positively associated such that increased safety knowledge should 
correspond with greater perceived safety. 
Hypothesis 6: Safety knowledge is positively related to perceived safety in the 
workplace. 
Outcomes of Perceived Safety 
 In addition to explaining how perceptions of safety are formed, cybernetic theory 
also offers a framework for understanding how perceived safety should influence 
employee well-being and subsequent safety behavior. In the sections that follow, 
perceived safety is posited to directly influence worker safety-related anxiety which 
should in turn influence worker safety behavior (i.e., compliance and participation).  
Safety-related anxiety (proximal outcome). Individuals who feel unsafe at 
work, whether or not it is true from an objective standpoint, will feel that their 
psychological need for safety is unsatisfied in that particular environment. In cybernetic 
terms, this represents a discrepancy or deviation from the desired state of feeling safe 
(Carver & Scheier, 1998; Lord, Diefendorff, Schmidt, & Hall, 2010). Cybernetic theory 
posits that the detection of such discrepancies is psychologically troubling and can lead 
to the experience of work strain (Cummings & Cooper, 1979; Edwards, 1992; Miller, 
1965). A perceived safety discrepancy should be particularly troubling due to a greater 
perceived possibility of incurring physical harm. Such a realization should increase 
mortality salience and likewise enhance anxiety or distress at work (Pyszczynski et al., 
1997). Consequently, perceived safety should be negatively associated with safety-
20 
 
related anxiety such that lower perceived safety is associated with greater levels of 
safety-specific anxiety.  
Hypothesis 7: Perceived safety is negatively associated with safety-related 
anxiety. 
Safety behavior (distal outcome). Worker safety behavior is theoretically a 
distal, indirect outcome of perceived safety that should operate as a coping mechanism 
in response to safety-related anxiety. Because individuals are inherently motivated to 
eliminate important discrepancies (Diefendorff & Chandler, 2011; Holroyd & Coles, 
2002) and a perceived safety discrepancy is posited to increase safety-related anxiety 
(Pyszczynski et al., 1997), eliminating this discrepancy should be a particularly 
influential motivator of behavior. Thus, a person who perceives greater anxiety as a 
result of feeling unsafe should be motivated to engage in behaviors targeted at reducing 
that anxiety (Cummings & Cooper, 1979; Edwards, 1992). Specifically, individuals are 
expected to increase their own safety behaviors in an effort to alleviate the anxiety 
resulting from this discrepancy.  
Like the recognized distinction between task and contextual job performance 
(Borman & Motowidlo, 1993), safety behaviors can be distinguished as directly 
contributing to core, required safety activities (e.g., wearing protective equipment) or as 
indirectly contributing to workplace safety through more discretionary means (i.e., 
attending safety meetings; Griffin & Neal, 2000). These safety behaviors are referred to 
as safety compliance and safety participation, respectively (Griffin & Neal, 2000). When 
feeling anxious due to low perceived safety, individuals are expected to engage in more 
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safety compliance and participation behaviors to reduce their anxiety and feel safer. 
Enhancing one’s own observance of designated work safety rules and regulations or 
working in more discretionary ways to promote workplace safety are direct ways 
individuals are expected to reduce a perceived safety discrepancy. Consequently, higher 
levels of safety-related anxiety should be associated with greater subsequent safety 
compliance and participation behaviors. 
Hypothesis 8: Safety-related anxiety is positively related to (a) safety compliance 
and (b) to safety participation. 
Summary of Hypotheses 
 In sum, the purpose of the posited hypotheses is to test the viability of a 
cybernetic framework applied to perceived safety. This study tests both context- and 
person-related correlates of perceived safety and also examines perceived safety’s 
associations with safety-related anxiety and subsequent safety behavior. Figure 2 
provides a graphic representation of this study’s hypotheses. As can be seen, Hypotheses 
1-3 pertain to proposed contextual antecedents of perceived safety and Hypotheses 4-6 
concern person-related antecedents. Hypothesis 7 posits that safety-related anxiety is a 
proximal outcome of perceived safety and Hypotheses 8a and 8b posit safety compliance 
and safety participation as distal outcomes, respectively, in response to safety-related 
anxiety. Ultimately, testing these hypotheses contributes to the extant occupational 
safety literature by suggesting both how perceptions of safety are formed in the 
workplace and also what implications these perceptions have for worker well-being and 
safety behavior.  
  
 
2
2 
 
 
Figure 2. Summary of study hypotheses. H1 = Hypothesis 1 and so forth. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
 Data for this study were collected from three unionized weapons production sites 
of a large defense company. The three sites are located in the southern United States. 
Participants across these three sites consisted of production employees and their 
respective foremen (i.e., immediate supervisors). Production employees were 
specifically targeted as participants because of the greater likelihood that they think 
about safety when working due to the safety-salient nature of their work (e.g., working 
with heavy machinery, dangerous materials). Across the three sites, 600 production 
employees completed surveys during a total of at least 21 separate employee meetings
1
; 
of these surveys, five were removed for clear patterns of careless responding (e.g., no 
variation in responses across the entire survey). Of the 595 useable responses (190, Site 
1; 151, Site 2; 254, Site 3), 69% were completed by male respondents with an average 
age of 41.97 (SD = 12.86) years and an average organizational tenure of 7.55 (SD = 
9.21) years.  
A demographic breakdown of respondent characteristics by site is provided in 
Table 1. As can be seen, there is a marked difference in demographic characteristics in 
Site 1 relative to Sites 2 and 3. Specifically, Site 1 included a larger proportion of male 
respondents (84.90%) who tended to be older (M = 48.50 years, SD = 12.03) and who  
 
                                                 
1
 This number is based on the number of meetings that were directly verified in sites 1 and 3. Site 2 
administered its surveys without reporting the number of meetings the surveys were administered in. The 
average number of employees who completed surveys in these meetings for sites 1 and 3 was 16.00 (SD = 
6.67) and 28.44 (SD = 15.75), respectively. The average number of employees who completed surveys in 
each meeting across the two sites was (M = 21.33, SD = 12.79). 
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Table 1 
Respondents’ Demographic Characteristics by Site 
Demographics Site 1 (n = 190) Site 2 (n = 151) Site 3 (n = 254) 
Sex (% Male) 84.90bc 71.10a 72.60a 
Age (M yrs) 48.50 (SD = 12.03)
bc
 35.99 (SD = 11.25)
ac
 40.47 (SD = 12.18)
ab
 
Job experience  
(M yrs) 
23.20 (SD = 12.04)
bc
 8.40 (SD = 9.42)
ac
 12.10 (SD = 10.95)
ab
 
Tenure (M yrs) 12.80 (SD = 11.88)
bc
 3.76 (SD = 4.59)
ac
 5.71 (SD = 6.75)
ab
 
 
Notes. Yrs = years; 
a
 Significantly different from Site 1, p < .05, two-tailed; 
b
 Significantly different from 
Site 2, p < .05, two-tailed; 
c
 Significantly different from Site 3, p < .05, two-tailed. 
 
tended to have been in the organization longer (M = 12.80 years, SD = 11.88) compared 
to the other two sites.  
Procedure 
Production employee surveys. Production employees’ data for this study were 
collected via a series of paper-and-pencil survey administrations. Employees at the 
participating work sites attend weekly meetings as workgroups to coordinate and discuss 
pertinent work-related issues (including safety). Survey measures were administered 
during one such meeting for each workgroup in September, 2011. In those meetings, a 
safety representative explained the general purpose of the survey and employees were 
then given time to complete the survey. Before starting the survey, employees were 
assured that their responses would be kept confidential and were encouraged to respond 
to all items honestly and to the best of their knowledge. This was communicated both 
verbally by the safety representative introducing the survey and in writing on the survey 
cover sheet.  
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 After data collection, production employees’ survey responses were entered into 
electronic form for statistical analyses by the author and three research assistants. To 
coordinate efforts and ensure accuracy of data entry, the author met with the research 
assistants to discuss the data entry process and all used a common instructions sheet. To 
check for accuracy early in the data entry process, each assistant re-entered a random 
subset of surveys from each of the other assistants. Of the 15 surveys that were re-
entered, only one revealed a data entering discrepancy; this discrepancy was resolved by 
re-examining the survey in question. 
 Foremen ratings. Self-reported employee identification numbers were used to 
identify the corresponding foreman for each production employee. Of the 595 employees 
who provided useable surveys, 378 (64%) provided identification numbers on their 
surveys; see Table 2 for a demographic comparison of employees who did and did not 
report identification numbers; as can be seen, these comparisons suggest that these two 
groups of employees were not dramatically different in terms of demographic 
characteristics. Mean comparisons for employees who did and did not report 
identification numbers on selected core constructs are reported in Appendix A.  
Human resource representatives at each site then matched foremen to employee 
identification numbers. Once the corresponding foremen were identified for each 
employee, the foremen were individually invited via email by their site’s environmental 
safety and health (ESH) director to participate in an online survey in which they were 
asked to rate the safety knowledge and safety behavior of some of their employees. They 
were then provided with a list of employee identification numbers to indicate which of  
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Table 2 
Employee Demographic Comparisons Based on the Decision to Provide Employee 
Identification Numbers  
Variable Provided ID (n = 378) Did Not Provide ID (n = 217) 
Sex (% Male) 76.40 76.00 
Age (M yrs) 43.13 (SD = 13.15) 39.25 (SD = 11.76) 
Job experience (M yrs) 15.74 (SD = 13.13) 12.74 (SD = 10.81) 
Tenure (M yrs) 8.17 (SD = 10.03) 6.16 (SD = 6.89) 
Hours per week (M) 41.59 (SD = 4.46) 42.23 (SD = 5.24) 
Supervisor (% Yes) 9.20 11.40 
 
Notes. M = Mean; n = number of respondents; SD = standard deviation. 
 
their employees to rate. Foremen were invited to rate their employees approximately one 
month after the production employee surveys were administered. The length of time 
between employee and foreman assessments reflects the length of time for these steps to 
be accomplished and does not represent a purposeful or theoretical decision. 
Of the 57 foremen who were invited to participate across all three sites, 24 
responded (42%) and rated a total of 83 employees (M = 3.19 [SD = 2.25] employees per 
foreman). However, one foreman’s ratings were removed because of questionable 
response patterns. Specifically, there was no rating variation across or within the rated 
employees and an apparent misinterpretation of scale anchors (i.e., responded “1 – 
Strongly Disagree” to every item for every employee). The removal of this foreman’s 
ratings resulted in 23 useable foreman responses and 75 total rated employees. 
Measures
2
 
                                                 
2
 All of the variables assessed in this study and their items are listed in Appendix B. 
 All of the psychological constructs assessed in both the employee and foreman 
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surveys were assessed in blocks such that all items assessing a common construct 
appeared in groups as opposed to being mixed throughout the survey. The constructs are 
listed below, starting with the constructs assessed in the production employees’ survey. 
Unless otherwise noted, all items were rated on a five-point agreement scale ranging 
from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree.” 
Psychological safety climate. Psychological safety climate was assessed using a 
30-item safety climate measure developed by Beus, Payne, and Arthur (2011). With 
items targeting perceptions of workgroup-level safety climates, this measure has 
demonstrated a consistent second-order factor structure and adequate dimension-level 
reliabilities (α = .90 - .97) across multiple samples with respondents from a diverse range 
of industries (Beus et al., 2011). The measure assesses content from seven first-order 
safety climate factors: management commitment to safety, safety communication, 
coworker safety practices, safety involvement, safety training, safety rewards, and safety 
equipment/housekeeping.  
For the present sample, a second-order factor structure with seven first-order 
factors revealed a good fit to the data (χ2 (398) = 1206.66; CFI = .94; RMSEA = .06; 
SRMR = .05). The coefficient alphas for the seven dimensions ranged from .82 (safety 
equipment/housekeeping) to .95 (management commitment to safety) suggesting good 
internal consistency for item responses within each dimension (M [α] = .88, SD = .04).  
Trait anxiety. Trait anxiety was assessed using the 10-item International 
Personality Item Pool (IPIP) representation of Costa and McCrae’s (1992) NEO-PI-R 
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anxiety facet—one of six identified Neuroticism facets. Participants were asked to 
indicate the extent to which each item accurately described them on a five-point scale 
ranging from 1 “very inaccurate” to 5 “very accurate.” Past administrations of IPIP’s 
anxiety measure have demonstrated good internal consistency reliability (α = .83) and 
strong correspondence to responses on the NEO-PI-R anxiety scale (r = .75; IPIP, 2011). 
In this sample, responses to trait anxiety revealed an alpha coefficient of .81, suggesting 
adequate internal consistency reliability. 
Self-reported safety knowledge. Employees’ safety knowledge was assessed 
using Griffin and Neal’s (2000) four generalized safety knowledge items and two 
additional items created for specific application to the participating organization. 
Responses to these six items revealed a coefficient alpha of .78. 
Perceived job risk. Perceived job risk was assessed using Jermier et al.’s (1989) 
three-item risk measure. Responses to these items revealed a coefficient alpha of .73 in 
the present administration. 
Safety locus of control. Safety locus of control was assessed using Jones and 
Wuebker’s (1985) internal and external safety locus of control items. Although past 
studies have combined both sets of items into a single safety locus of control scale, poor 
item inter-correlations in previous administrations (cf. Cigularov, Chen, & Stallones, 
2009) raise questions regarding the dimensionality of this scale. To test the 
dimensionality of this measure in the present sample, an exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) using direct oblimin rotation was conducted; results revealed evidence of two 
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separate factors when both scales were combined
3
. Consequently, these two scales were 
separated for the present study. The coefficient alphas for responses to the separated 
internal (6 items) and external (6 items) safety locus of control scales were .84 and .73, 
respectively.  
Perceived safety. Perceived safety was assessed using a six-item measure 
developed for this study. The items were constructed to assess the degree to which 
workers feel safe, or free from harm, in their respective workplaces. Four of the six 
items were administered in two previous samples of workers. Specifically, the items 
were administered online to an employed student sample (N = 342; 44% male) and an 
international sample of employed respondents (N = 444; 53% male; 88% U.S. residents; 
see Beus et al., 2011 for administration details). Both samples revealed unidimensional 
factor structures and acceptable internal consistencies (α = .94 and .90, respectively). An 
example item is “I feel safe at my workplace.” Despite favorable validity evidence from 
these previous administrations, two additional items were developed for this study to 
provide better representation of the content domain. Specifically, two items were 
developed to more directly assess perceived safety as an appraisal of need fulfillment. 
These items are “My need for safety is fulfilled at work” and “At work, my need for 
safety is satisfied.” An EFA of responses to these six items’ in the present sample 
confirmed a one-factor structure. Responses to these items also revealed good internal 
consistency with a coefficient alpha of .90. 
                                                 
3
 Safety externality items were reversed prior to running this analysis so that high scores for all items 
represented higher levels of internal safety locus of control. 
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Safety-related anxiety. Safety-related anxiety was assessed using a modified 
form of Marteau and Bekker’s (1992) six-item version of the state scale of the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). Marteau and 
Bekker’s (1992) shortened state anxiety measure has produced similar scores relative to 
the more expansive 20-item STAI state anxiety scale and previous administrations have 
also demonstrated adequate reliability (α = .82). To assess safety-specific anxiety, the 
instructions for the measure were modified to prompt participants to respond to items 
with consideration of their general level of safety-related anxiety at work. Specifically, 
participants rated the extent to which the items were true with regard to their safety at 
work on a four-point scale ranging from 1 “Not at all” to 4 “Very much.” It is 
noteworthy that a four-point scale was used for this measure to be consistent with the 
format of this scale used in previous analyses (e.g., Marteau & Bekker, 1992) and also as 
a means of reducing item anchoring effects that can lead to greater concerns of common 
method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Responses to this 
measure revealed a coefficient alpha of .80 in the present sample, suggesting adequate 
internal consistency. 
Safety compliance and participation. Self-reported safety compliance (4 items) 
and safety participation (4 items) were assessed using items developed by Griffin and 
Neal (2000; Neal & Griffin, 2006). Responses to these items have demonstrated 
adequate internal consistencies in past research (safety compliance, α = .92-.93; safety 
participation, α = .86-.89; Neal & Griffin, 2006) and likewise revealed favorable internal 
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consistency in the present sample (safety compliance, α = .92 and safety participation, α 
= .86).  
 Knowledge of injuries. Knowledge of workplace injuries was assessed using 
three items developed for this study. These items assessed knowledge of personally 
experienced injuries, witnessed injuries, and injuries learned of indirectly. These 
respective items and corresponding descriptive statistics are as follows: “How many 
times have you been injured in this job?” (M = .34, SD = 1.19), “How many times have 
you personally witnessed a co-worker getting injured on this job?” (M = .63, SD = 2.57), 
and “How many co-worker injuries have you learned about in this job that you did not 
personally witness?” (M = 2.12, SD = 5.21). Responses to these questions were summed 
to arrive at an overall estimate of workers’ knowledge of workplace injuries (M = 3.03, 
SD = 7.60). 
Foreman Measures 
Although production employees responded to paper-and-pencil surveys due to 
limited computer access, foremen were less constrained and were thus invited to rate 
their employees’ safety knowledge and behavior using an online survey instrument. The 
constructs included in the foreman measure are listed below. All items were rated on a 
five-point agreement scale ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree.” 
 Opportunity to observe safety behavior. A single item was included in the 
foreman survey to assess the extent to which foremen had adequate opportunity to 
observe of their employees’ safety performance prior to providing ratings. This was 
included solely as a means of verifying the appropriateness of foreman ratings. Foremen 
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each responded to the item: “I have had sufficient opportunity to observe this 
employee’s safety performance.” The mean response for this item was 4.16 (SD = .87), 
suggesting that foremen generally agreed with the above statement. 
 Employee safety knowledge. As with employee-reported safety knowledge, 
foreman-rated employee safety knowledge was assessed using Griffin and Neal’s (2000) 
four generalized safety knowledge items and two additional items created for specific 
application to the participating organization. These items were altered slightly to reflect 
the fact that foreman were rating employees’ safety knowledge and not their own (e.g., 
“This employee knows how to perform his/her job in a safe manner”). Responses to 
these items had a coefficient alpha of .92. However, these items were assessed solely as 
a means of comparison with employee-reported safety knowledge. Because an 
employee’s self-reported safety knowledge (whether accurate or not) should be most 
influential on their perceived safety, foreman-reported safety knowledge was not used to 
test Hypothesis 7. Interestingly, the correlation between employee-reported (M = 4.34, 
SD = .50) and foreman-reported (M = 4.40, SD = .58) safety knowledge was -.06, 
suggesting no correspondence between employee and foreman ratings. It is worth noting, 
however, that there was minimal variance in both employee and foreman ratings of 
safety knowledge which may partially explain the lack of association between the two 
sources.  
 Employee safety compliance and participation. Griffin and Neal’s (2000) 
safety compliance (4 items) and safety participation (4 items) were also used to obtain 
foreman safety behavior ratings with the items being altered to reflect their non-self-
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report nature (e.g., “This employee carries out his/her work in a safe manner”). 
Responses to foreman-reported safety compliance and participation items revealed good 
internal consistencies (α = .94 and .87, respectively). Both employee-reported and 
foreman-reported safety behavior ratings were used to draw conclusions regarding 
Hypotheses 8a and 8b because foreman reports of employee behavior could provide 
additional evidence beyond self-reported safety behavior concerning safety-related 
anxiety’s associations with safety compliance and participation. Like safety knowledge, 
it is noteworthy that there was very little correspondence between employee-reported 
safety behaviors and foreman-reported safety behaviors (r = .05, safety compliance; r = 
.08, safety participation). It is possible, however, that this is a result of restricted 
variance in safety behavior ratings from both sources and that the two ratings are less 
divergent than suggested by these low correlations. A comparison of mean safety 
compliance (employee-reported, M = 4.34 [SD = .59; range = 3.00], versus foreman-
reported, M = 4.45 [SD = .56; range = 2.25]) and safety participation ratings (employee-
reported, M = 4.34 [SD = .64; range = 3.25] versus foreman-reported, M = 4.45 [SD = 
.65; range = 2.50]) across sources offers some support for this explanation. 
Ancillary Measures – Employee-Reported 
Impression management. Impression management was assessed using four 
items from the IPIP representation of the Personality Attributes Survey (PAS; Paulhus, 
1991). This variable was not assessed to address any substantive hypotheses. Rather, 
impression management was included in the overall measure to allow exploratory 
examinations of the extent to which it shares associations with participants’ responses to 
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substantive variables. This is one means of gauging the degree to which survey 
responses appear to be the product of impression management. These items revealed a 
coefficient alpha of .62 in the present sample, suggesting poor internal consistency. 
However, because the expected commonality among the items should solely be a pattern 
of socially desirable responding, the poor internal consistency suggests that impression 
management may not be a serious concern in this sample. Items were rated on a five-
point scale ranging from 1 “very inaccurate” to 5 “very accurate.” 
Safety threshold. Safety threshold was measured to test the core assumption that 
workers consider it important to feel safe at work. This variable was assessed solely as a 
means of affirming this theoretical assumption and was not included to test any formal 
hypotheses. Three items were created for this study to assess safety threshold. The 
internal consistency reliability of responses to these items was satisfactory (α = .84).  
Dutifulness. Dutifulness, a facet of conscientiousness, was assessed as an 
instrument variable to facilitate the proper estimation of this study’s non-recursive 
structural equation models. Instrument variables allow non-recursive models to be 
identified and should (a) share a direct, meaningful association with only one variable in 
a reciprocal relationship, (b) not be caused by either variable in the reciprocal 
association, and (c) be unrelated to unmeasured causes of the unrelated reciprocal 
variable (Edwards, 1992; James & Singh, 1978). Because this study incorporates an 
indirect feedback loop (where a variable mediates one direction of the reciprocal 
relationship), only one of the variables in the reciprocal relationship required an 
instrument variable for proper model identification (Kline, 2005). Consequently, the 
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personality facet of dutifulness was selected as the instrument for this study because of 
its theoretical correspondence with employee safety behavior (i.e., compliance and 
participation) and because it likewise should not be directly associated with perceived 
safety or any unmeasured causes of perceived safety. Dutifulness was assessed using six 
items from the IPIP representation of Costa and McCrae’s (1992) NEO-PI-R dutifulness 
facet. Participants indicated the extent to which each item accurately described them on 
a five-point scale ranging from 1 “very inaccurate” to 5 “very accurate.” The coefficient 
alpha for responses to these items was .92.  
Job satisfaction. Job satisfaction was assessed using the six-item shortened 
version of Brayfield and Rothe’s (1951) 18-item global job satisfaction measure. Several 
past studies have demonstrated both validity and reliability evidence for the shortened 
measure (e.g., Agho, Price, & Mueller, 1992; Brooke, Russell, & Price, 1988). It is 
noteworthy that this construct was not assessed to directly address any formal 
hypotheses. Rather, it was included in the study to provide secondary evidence that 
perceived safety is associated with employee well-being. These items were responded to 
using a seven-point agreement scale ranging from 1 “Strongly disagree” to 7 “Strongly 
agree.” Internal consistency for the responses to this measure in the present sample were 
satisfactory (α = .87). 
Life satisfaction. Life satisfaction was assessed using Diener, Emmons, Larsen, 
and Griffin’s (1985) five-item measure. Like job satisfaction, this measure was included 
in the study to determine the extent to which perceived safety is associated with worker 
well-being indicators beyond just safety-related anxiety. These items were assessed 
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using the same seven-point scale as job satisfaction and responses had favorable internal 
consistency (α = .86).  
Psychological contract fulfillment. Psychological contract fulfillment with 
regard to workplace safety was assessed using four items derived from Robinson and 
Morrison’s (2000) measure of perceived contract fulfillment. As with job and life 
satisfaction, this construct was assessed to provide additional evidence for perceived 
safety’s association with other meaningful outcome variables and was not included to 
address any formal hypotheses. Responses to these items had a coefficient alpha of .83.  
Analyses 
 This study’s hypotheses were tested using both non-recursive and recursive 
structural equation modeling (SEM). SEM is appropriate in this context because the 
majority of this study’s variables represent latent psychological constructs (Anderson & 
Gerbing, 1988; Bollen, 2002). Non-recursive models were estimated for analyses using 
only production employee responses whereas recursive models were used to test 
hypotheses that incorporated both employee and foreman responses (because these were 
separated in time). Non-recursive models are necessary when examining concurrent 
associations that are theorized to constitute negative feedback loops. This is because 
non-recursive models acknowledge the possibility of mutual causation (Kline, 2005). In 
this case, because perceived safety is theoretically expected to affect safety behavior 
through its influence on safety-related anxiety, and because safety behavior should in 
turn directly affect perceived safety, a non-recursive model was deemed most 
appropriate.  
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It is important to note that a key assumption for properly estimating a non-
recursive model is that the hypothesized causal sequence has reached a state of 
equilibrium (Kaplan, Harik, & Hotchkiss, 2001; Kline, 2005). This means that the causal 
process under consideration should be at a steady state when a cross-sectional “snap-
shot” of the process is taken (Kaplan et al., 2001; Kenny, 1979). This is a reasonable 
assumption for the current study because workers should already have perceived their 
safety level to be a function of the work context and past events (e.g., injuries) and their 
reported levels of safety-related anxiety and safety behavior should likewise have been a 
function of their perceived safety at the time of survey completion. In other words, the 
theorized causal process examined in this study was not expected to be so dynamic as to 
suppose it would be shifting during the time of survey completion.  
In addition to the hypothesized paths specified in this model, there were a 
number of other parameters that were estimated based on theory and research to achieve 
more accurate model fit; non-hypothesized parameters are indicated by dashed lines in 
Figure 3. First, in accord with extant theory (Zohar, 2003) and meta-analytic research, 
which has revealed a meaningful negative relationship between past injuries and 
psychological safety climate (Beus et al., 2010), a path from knowledge of past injuries 
to psychological safety climate was specified in the proposed model. Second, a path 
from knowledge of injuries to perceived job risk was estimated given that prior injury 
knowledge is likely also to affect perceptions concerning the riskiness inherent to the 
job. Third, paths from safety locus of control and trait anxiety to perceived job risk were 
estimated due to the likelihood that these traits also influence workers’ appraisals of job  
  
 
3
8 
 
Figure 3. Summary of all estimated paths in single-source models. Hypothesized paths are represented by solid lines whereas 
non-hypothesized parameters are represented by dashed lines.  
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risk. Fourth, because safety climate is theoretically expected to affect safety behavior 
(Zohar, 2003) and has consistently demonstrated positive associations with safety 
performance (Christian et al., 2009; Clarke, 2006), paths from psychological safety 
climate to both safety compliance and safety participation were estimated. Fifth, because 
safety compliance and participation have demonstrated meaningful associations in past 
research (Christian et al., 2009; Neal & Griffin, 2006), these variables were freed to 
correlate with each other in the proposed model. Sixth, because trait anxiety should at 
least partially explain situational anxiety (Spielberger et al., 1970), a path from trait 
anxiety to safety-related anxiety was also specified in the model. Further, a path from 
safety climate to safety knowledge was estimated in light of previous meta-analytic 
evidence which has revealed a significant association between the constructs (Christian 
et al., 2009). Finally, given that safety knowledge has demonstrated meaningful 
associations with general safety behavior (Christian et al., 2009) and safety compliance 
and participation specifically (Griffin & Neal, 2000), paths from safety knowledge to 
safety compliance and safety participation were also estimated.  
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RESULTS 
Preliminary Invariance Tests 
Because data were collected from three distinct work sites, a preliminary step 
before combining responses across sites to test hypotheses was to determine that core 
constructs were perceived similarly by participants in each site. Consequently, a series of 
multi-group confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were conducted to test for metric 
invariance in selected core constructs: perceived safety, safety climate, safety 
compliance, and safety participation. Metric invariance (i.e., invariance of factor 
structures and item factor loadings) is considered the standard for determining that a 
construct is invariant across groups (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989; Muthén & 
Muthén, 2010). Failure to achieve metric invariance in these constructs would suggest 
that employees across the three sites perceived the constructs distinctly enough to 
preclude combining responses in an omnibus test of this study’s hypotheses. Conversely, 
verification of metric invariance in these core constructs would provide evidence to 
suggest that combining responses across sites is appropriate. 
 Results of these selected invariance tests are reported in Table 3. As can be seen, 
although safety compliance (Δχ2 [6] = 5.47, ns) and safety participation (Δχ2 [6] = 10.68, 
ns) were metrically invariant across the three sites, perceived safety (Δχ2 [10] = 19.17, p 
< .05) and safety climate (Δχ2 [58] = 80.33, p < .05) were not. The failure of perceived 
safety, this study’s core construct, to achieve metric invariance across the three sites 
offers sufficient evidence alone that it may not be appropriate to combine worker 
responses across sites for statistical tests. It is noteworthy, however, that perceived safety  
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Table 3 
Multi-Group Invariance Tests Across Sites 
Model Χ2 df Δ Χ2 Δdf RMSEA CFI SRMR 
Perceived Safety  
(*Χ2Crit (10) = 18.31, p < .05) 
       
   Configural Invariance 188.33 39   .14 .93 .14 
   Metric Invariance 207.50 49 19.17* 10 .13 .93 .17 
Safety Climate 
(*Χ2Crit (58) = 76.78, p < .05) 
       
   Configural Invariance 2,922.45 1254   .08 .89 .07 
   Metric Invariance 3,002.78 1312 80.33* 58 .08 .89 .09 
Safety Compliance 
(*Χ2Crit (6) = 12.59, p < .05) 
       
   Configural Invariance 34.38 14   .09 .99 .07 
   Metric Invariance 39.85 20 5.47 6 .07 .99 .09 
Safety Participation 
(*Χ2Crit (58) = 76.78, p < .05) 
       
   Configural Invariance 82.87 14   .16 .94 .08 
   Metric Invariance 93.55 20 10.68 6 .14 .93 .11 
 
Notes. These analyses were tested using full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation; df = 
degrees of freedom; Δ Χ2 = the difference in Χ2 to the next restricted model (e.g., configural tested against 
metric invariance); Δ df = change in df; RMSEA = root mean-square error approximation; CFI = 
comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual. 
a
Analyses that meet the accepted 
standard for perceptual equivalence (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989). 
 
was still represented well by a one-factor structure in each of the three sites (χ2 [9] = 
51.46, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .16
4
, SRMR = .04, site 1; χ2 [9] = 39.80, CFI = .96, 
RMSEA = .15, SRMR = .03, site 2; χ2 [9] = 52.26, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .14, SRMR = 
.03, site 3). Its failure to achieve metric invariance simply suggests that the extent to 
which the latent construct explained variance in individual items differed by site. This 
                                                 
4
 RMSEA values are particularly prone to bias for models with few degrees of freedom such as this. 
Although it is reported here to be consistent with reporting convention, Kenny, Kaniskan, and McCoach 
(2011) argue that it is not informative to compute RMSEA for models with few degrees of freedom. 
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was likewise true of safety climate. Although it failed to demonstrate metric invariance, 
the construct was still represented sufficiently by a second-order factor structure with 
seven first-order factors in each individual site (χ2 [398] = 919.79, CFI = .89, RMSEA = 
.08, SRMR = .06, site 1; χ2 [398] = 919.14, CFI = .89, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .06, site 
2; χ2 [398] = 864.96, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .06, site 3). This is consistent 
with evidence in past administrations which likewise supports a second-order factor 
structure for safety climate (cf. Beus et al., 2011). 
 In light of the preceding evidence, it was deemed most appropriate to test this 
study’s hypotheses separately within each of the three participating sites as opposed to 
conducting one omnibus test of hypotheses that incorporated data from all three sites. 
This decision meant that each hypothesis was evaluated three times and subsequently 
offers the ability to cross-validate the proposed theoretical model.  
Hypothesis Tests 
Descriptive statistics and variable intercorrelations for all study variables are 
reported separately for each site in Tables 4 through 6 (corresponding to sites 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively). For completeness, descriptive statistics and variable intercorrelations for 
the combined sample are reported in Appendix C as well.   
Perceived safety antecedents. Overall model results for each site are depicted in 
Figures 4 through 6 with standardized path coefficients listed for both hypothesized and 
non-hypothesized paths. Similarly, a model illustrating results for the full sample is 
provided in Appendix D. It is important to note that these models represent single-source 
associations only; Table 7 reports the results for Hypotheses 8a and 8b across the three  
  
 
4
3 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics and Variable Inter-correlations for Site 1 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 
1. Psychological safety 
climate 
3.64 0.62 (.88)         
2. Trait anxiety 2.55 0.68 -.09 (.83)        
3. Dutifulness 4.13 0.70 .29* -.26* (.93)       
4. Impression management 3.82 0.65 .22* -.23* .58* (.56)      
5. Safety knowledge 4.34 0.55 .43* -.30* .46* .33* (.89)     
6. Job risk 2.76 1.08 .02 .17* -.05 -.03 .12 (.87)    
7. Safety threshold 4.20 0.68 .33* .06 .27* .24* .20* .08 (.82)   
8. Internal locus of control 3.70 0.67 .10 .04 .16* .10 .20* .05 .22* (.86)  
9. External locus of control 2.71 0.59 -.09 .31* -.24* -.23* -.21* .27* .03 -.02 (.73) 
10. Perceived safety  3.90 0.64 .36* -.19* .16* .08 .27* -.30* .16* .13 -.11 
11. Safety anxiety
 a
 1.65 0.56 -.13 .43* -.04 -.07 -.16* .31* .06 .00 .28* 
12. Job satisfaction
 b
 5.06 1.12 .31* -.25* .30* .30* .26* -.09 .26* .17* -.05 
13. Life satisfaction
 b
 4.88 1.17 .26* -.27* .28* .19* .15* -.07 .16* .12 -.01 
14. Psychological contract 
fulfillment 
3.92 0.67 .53* -.11 .23* .03 .26* -.17* .27* .12 -.23* 
15. Safety compliance  4.18 0.63 .38* -.13 .37* .23* .56* .04 .26* .25* -.20* 
16. Safety participation 3.80 0.69 .47* -.08 .28* .19* .52* .24* .35* .28* -.10 
17. Knowledge of injuries 5.14 10.70 -.19* .03 -.19* -.07 -.04 .11 -.17* -.08 .02 
18. Experienced injuries 0.58 1.18 -.11 .09 -.16* -.03 .01 .24* -.11 -.20* .05 
19. Witnessed injuries 1.21 4.10 -.11 .00 -.13 -.01 -.03 .07 -.10 -.02 -.03 
20. Learned injuries 3.42 7.32 -.20* .03 -.17* -.10 -.04 .09 -.17* -.09 .04 
 
Notes. These numbers are based on 190 employee responses in Site 1; Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are coefficient alphas; N = 23 for 
correlations involving foreman-rated variables; 
a
 Items assessed using a 4-point scale; 
b
 Items assessed using a 7-point scale. * p ≤ .05, two-tailed. 
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Table 4 continued… 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
21. Age 48.50 12.03 .03 .06 .09 .08 .13 .18* .03 .12 .01 
22. Job experience 23.20 12.04 .06 .01 .08 .09 .18* .16* .03 .13 -.10 
23. Tenure 12.80 11.88 .01 .06 -.09 .07 .00 .19* -.02 .02 .07 
24. Hours worked per week 41.81 4.97 .02 -.09 .16* .16* .07 -.06 -.06 .04 -.04 
Foremen-rated variables            
25. Opportunity to observe 3.87 0.92 .01 -.31 .38 .41 -.09 -.01 .43* -.06 -.10 
26. Safety knowledge 4.15 0.52 .01 -.26 .44* .31 -.20 .00 .49* -.01 .00 
27. Safety compliance 4.20  0.60 .20 -.28 .50* .36 -.26 -.07 .47* -.16 .01 
28. Safety participation  4.08 0.56 -.18 -.06 .31 .33 -.17 .09 .30 .21 .14 
 
Notes. These numbers are based on 190 employee responses in Site 1; Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are coefficient alphas; N = 23 for 
correlations involving foreman-rated variables. * p ≤ .05, two-tailed. 
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Table 4 continued… 
Variable M SD 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
10. Perceived safety 3.90 0.64 (.90)         
11. Safety anxiety
 a
 1.65 0.56 -.37* (.84)        
12. Job satisfaction
 b
 5.06 1.12 .22* -.30* (.87)       
13. Life satisfaction
 b
 4.88 1.17 .26* -.34* .62* (.88)      
14. Psychological contract 
fulfillment 
3.92 0.67 .53* -.28* .27* .39* (.84)     
15. Safety compliance 4.18 0.63 .35* -.22* .39* .31* .50* (.92)    
16. Safety participation 3.80 0.69 .17* -.03 .25* .21* .33* .62* (.86)   
17. Knowledge of injuries 5.14 10.70 -.14 .16* -.16* -.17* -.18* -.11 -.04 --  
18. Experienced injuries 0.58 1.18 -.20* .29* -.24* -.29* -.16* -.15* .01 .36* -- 
19. Witnessed injuries 1.21 4.10 -.04 .04 -.06 -.05 -.15* -.05 .02 .80* .14 
20. Learned injuries 3.42 7.32 -.14 .17* -.16* -.18* -.15* -.11 -.08 .94* .29* 
21. Age 48.50 12.03 -.01 .16* .09 .04 .01 .23* .27* .14 .21* 
22. Job experience 23.20 12.04 .02 .09 .09 -.01 .05 .23* .24* .23* .25* 
23. Tenure 12.80 11.88 -.07 .06 .03 -.03 -.09 .01 .09 .34* .45* 
24. Hours worked per week 41.81 4.97 .13 .06 .10 .04 .01 .05 -.04 .00 -.07 
Foremen-rated variables            
25. Opportunity to observe 3.87 0.92 .33 .06 .16 .26 -.05 -.42* -.08 .22 -.32 
26. Safety knowledge 4.15 0.52 .48* -.10 .18 .38 .08 -.24 .04 .33 -.18 
27. Safety compliance 4.20  0.60 .46* -.09 .17 .30 .05 -.37 .00 .24 -.40 
28. Safety participation 4.08 0.56 .37 .04 -.09 .07 .04 -.37 -.32 .30 -.21 
 
Notes. These numbers are based on 190 employee responses in Site 1; Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are coefficient alphas; N = 23 for 
correlations involving foreman-rated variables; 
a
 Items assessed using a 4-point scale; 
b
 Items assessed using a 7-point scale. * p ≤ .05, two-tailed. 
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Table 4 continued… 
Variable M SD 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
19. Witnessed injuries 1.21 4.10 --          
20. Learned injuries  3.42 7.32 .58* --         
21. Age 48.50 12.03 .11 .11 --        
22. Job experience 23.20 12.04 .17 .20* .84* --       
23. Tenure 12.80 11.88 .24* .29* .54* .61* --      
24. Hours worked per week  41.81 4.97 -.01 .00 -.03 .07 -.05 --     
Foremen-rated variables             
25. Opportunity to observe 3.87 0.92 .21 .23 -.25 -.11 -.07 .31 --    
26. Safety knowledge 4.15 0.52 .32 .29 -.15 -.13 -.01 .09 .71* (.92)   
27. Safety compliance 4.20  0.60 .22 .29 -.21 -.23 -.20 .02 .79* .87* (.93)  
28. Safety participation  4.08 0.56 .35 .22 -.35 -.28 -.06 .18 .57* .79* .68* (.89) 
 
Notes. These numbers are based on 190 employee responses in Site 1; Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are coefficient alphas; N = 23 for 
correlations involving foreman-rated variables. * p ≤ .05, two-tailed. 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics and Variable Inter-correlations for Site 2 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Psychological safety 
climate 
3.91 0.65 (.89)         
2. Trait anxiety 2.44 0.62 -.15* (.80)        
3. Dutifulness 4.40 0.56 .34* -.06 (.91)       
4. Impression management 3.97 0.65 .20* -.12 .40* (.66)      
5. Safety knowledge 4.18 0.44 .35* -.10 .25* .17* (.65)     
6. Job risk 2.97 0.70 .09 .00 .06 .03 .34* (.52)    
7. Safety threshold 4.26 0.71 .19* .00 .41* .22* .25* .14 (.86)   
8. Internal locus of control 3.88 0.61 .12 -.03 .28* .24* .19* -.01 .31* (.81)  
9. External locus of control 2.44 0.63 -.12 .33* -.17* -.15 .09 .14 -.15 -.15 (.76) 
10. Perceived safety  4.19 0.61 .23* -.16 .34* .29* .20* -.29* .39* .37* -.17* 
11. Safety anxiety
 a
 1.46 0.43 -.32* .39* -.18* -.07 -.12 -.01 -.11 -.07 .33* 
12. Job satisfaction
 b
 5.30 1.04 .32* -.29* .32* .23* .09 -.04 .24* .32* -.34* 
13. Life satisfaction
 b
 5.10 1.08 .24* -.35* .16 .18* -.01 -.12 .27* .16 -.22* 
14. Psychological contract 
fulfillment 
4.34 0.66 .56* -.06 .55* .22* .18* -.10 .28* .33* -.24* 
15. Safety compliance  4.43 0.58 .58* -.12 .61* .33* .46* .04 .40* .32* -.26* 
16. Safety participation 4.13 0.66 .53* -.16 .39* .37* .45* .17* .25* .22* -.15 
17. Knowledge of injuries 0.72 1.46 -.04 .00 .00 -.06 .04 .11 -.01 .00 -.11 
18. Experienced injuries 0.02 0.14 .06 -.05 .13 .03 .08 .01 .11 .11 .03 
19. Witnessed injuries 0.10 0.45 .23 -.09 .16 .10 .02 -.10 .12 .06 -.24* 
20. Learned injuries 0.62 1.29 -.11 .04 -.07 -.10 .04 .14 -.05 -.02 -.06 
 
Notes. These numbers are based on 151 employee responses in Site 2; Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are coefficient alphas; N = 20 for 
correlations involving foreman-rated variables; 
a
 Items assessed using a 4-point scale; 
b
 Items assessed using a 7-point scale. * p ≤ .05, two-tailed. 
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Table 5 continued… 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
21. Age 35.99 11.25 -.04 .08 .12 .14 .03 .09 .05 .13 -.07 
22. Job experience 8.40 9.42 .02 .18* -.03 -.03 .15 .06 .12 .18* .00 
23. Tenure 3.76 4.59 -.16 .20* -.15 -.08 .08 .04 .00 -.10 .05 
24. Hours worked per week 41.49 5.76 .19 .05 -.02 -.14 .04 .11 -.10 .00 -.11 
Foremen-rated variables 4.40 1.05 -.10 .26 .15 -.26 .13 .28 .15 -.08 .46* 
25. Opportunity to observe 4.67 0.59 -.17 .24 .05 -.23 .11 .35 .05 -.06 .46* 
26. Safety knowledge 4.63 0.59 -.18 .25 .06 -.31 .06 .40 .18 -.13 .49* 
27. Safety compliance 4.38 0.72 -.16 .24 .12 -.14 .16 .57* .17 .02 .46* 
 
Notes. These numbers are based on 151 employee responses in Site 2; Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are coefficient alphas; N = 20 for 
correlations involving foreman-rated variables. * p ≤ .05, two-tailed. 
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Table 5 continued… 
Variable M SD 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
10. Perceived safety 4.19 0.61 (.92)         
11. Safety anxiety
 a
 1.46 0.43 -.30* (.73)        
12. Job satisfaction
 b
 5.30 1.04 .24* -.21* (.85)       
13. Life satisfaction
 b
 5.10 1.08 .29* -.31* .51* (.87)      
14. Psychological contract 
fulfillment 
4.34 0.66 .50* -.37* .38* .29* (.80)     
15. Safety compliance 4.43 0.58 .47* -.34* .38* .18* .68* (.93)    
16. Safety participation 4.13 0.66 .27* -.31* .30* .20* .45* .71* (.86)   
17. Knowledge of injuries 0.72 1.46 -.11 -.05 -.01 .10 -.09 .00 -.04 --  
18. Experienced injuries 0.02 0.14 .03 .03 .10 .04 .03 .15 .12 .30* -- 
19. Witnessed injuries 0.10 0.45 .14 -.12 .15 .14 .18* .19* .07 .51* .40* 
20. Learned injuries 0.62 1.29 -.15 -.03 -.06 .07 -.15 -.07 -.06 .95* .08 
21. Age 35.99 11.25 -.07 .08 .13 -.02 .07 .08 .07 .17 .15 
22. Job experience 8.40 9.42 -.05 .08 .13 -.06 .03 .07 .19* .13 .13 
23. Tenure 3.76 4.59 -.18* .13 -.03 -.15 -.17* -.12 -.01 .12 -.04 
24. Hours worked per week 41.49 5.76 -.09 -.18* -.02 -.01 .13 .12 .19* .07 -.25* 
Foremen-rated variables            
25. Opportunity to observe 4.40 1.05 -.24 .14 -.22 -.12 -.09 .10 .24 .10 .14 
26. Safety knowledge 4.67 0.59 -.25 .13 -.27 -.24 -.14 .04 .14 .04 .07 
27. Safety compliance 4.63 0.59 -.23 .07 -.20 -.16 -.11 .06 .20 -.08 -.05 
28. Safety participation 4.38 0.72 -.18 -.02 -.16 -.24 -.05 .08 .27 -.23 -.21 
 
Notes. These numbers are based on 151 employee responses in Site 2; Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are coefficient alphas; N = 20 for 
correlations involving foreman-rated variables; 
a
 Items assessed using a 4-point scale; 
b
 Items assessed using a 7-point scale. * p ≤ .05, two-tailed. 
  
  
 
5
0 
Table 5 continued… 
Variable M SD 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
19. Witnessed injuries 0.10 0.45 --          
20. Learned injuries  0.62 1.29 .22* --         
21. Age 35.99 11.25 .21* .11 --        
22. Job experience 8.40 9.42 .15 .11 .68* --       
23. Tenure 3.76 4.59 -.01 .13 .40* .56* --      
24. Hours worked per week  41.49 5.76 .00 .10 -.02 .14 .08 --     
Foremen-rated variables             
25. Opportunity to observe 4.40 1.05 .19 .05 .38 .38 .22 .22 --    
26. Safety knowledge 4.67 0.59 .12 -.01 .45* .44 .31 .23 .92* (.99)   
27. Safety compliance 4.63 0.59 .02 -.13 .42 .42 .34 .23 .92* .96* (.97)  
28. Safety participation  4.38 0.72 -.13 -.26 .24 .26 .28 .22 .78* .87* .92* (.89) 
 
Notes. These numbers are based on 151 employee responses in Site 2; Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are coefficient alphas; N = 20 for 
correlations involving foreman-rated variables. * p ≤ .05, two-tailed. 
  
  
 
5
1 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics and Variable Inter-correlations for Site 3 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Psychological safety 
climate 
3.88 0.56 (.86)         
2. Trait anxiety 2.46 0.64 -.29* (.81)        
3. Dutifulness 4.28 0.64 .34* -.21* (.91)       
4. Impression management 3.83 0.67 .21* -.22* .49* (.63)      
5. Safety knowledge 4.45 0.47 .49* -.23* .48* .30* (.88)     
6. Job risk 2.93 1.03 -.15* .07 -.10 -.10 -.02 (.79)    
7. Safety threshold 4.31 0.67 .21* -.08 .34* .20* .44* .12 (.83)   
8. Internal locus of control 3.71 0.65 .15* -.02 .29* .12* .24* .01 .17* (.84)  
9. External locus of control 2.57 0.59 -.13* .34* -.19* -.13* -.23* .20* -.02 -.08 (.68) 
10. Perceived safety  3.88 0.68 .49* -.29* .25* .13* .35* -.25* .03 .24* -.26* 
11. Safety anxiety
 a
 1.58 0.49 -.32* .42* -.17* -.18* -.23* .27* .01 -.04 .24* 
12. Job satisfaction
 b
 4.90 1.19 .35* -.33* .29* .25* .32* -.15* .26* .16* -.14* 
13. Life satisfaction
 b
 4.73 1.12 .31* -.29* .25* .27* .27* -.14* .11 .13* -.18* 
14. Psychological contract 
fulfillment 
4.08 0.61 .52* -.28* .28* .13* .39* -.23* .06 .20* -.31* 
15. Safety compliance  4.40 0.54 .50* -.22* .54* .30* .63* -.13* .34* .23* -.19* 
16. Safety participation 4.08 0.65 .35* -.11 .30* .16* .41* .01 .17* .24* -.16* 
17. Knowledge of injuries 2.89 6.49 .03 -.14 .03 .07 .04 .23* -.05 -.13 .08 
18. Experienced injuries 0.35 1.50 .05 -.01 .02 .08 .03 .12 .01 -.13* .17* 
19. Witnessed injuries 0.51 1.46 .01 -.09 .07 .06 .00 .14* -.03 -.12 .02 
20. Learned injuries 2.07 4.45 .02 -.16* .01 .05 .05 .19* -.08 -.10 .05 
 
Notes. These numbers are based on 254 employee responses in Site 3; Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are coefficient alphas; N = 32 for 
correlations involving foreman-rated variables; 
a
 Items assessed using a 4-point scale; 
b
 Items assessed using a 7-point scale. * p ≤ .05, two-tailed. 
  
  
 
5
2 
Table 6 continued… 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
21. Age 40.47 12.18 .04 .08 .13 .11 .11 .03 .26* -.09 -.02 
22. Job experience 12.10 10.95 -.01 .10 -.03 .03 -.05 -.05 .09 -.07 .02 
23. Tenure 5.71 6.75 .09 .09 .05 .10 .08 .04 .12 -.04 .08 
24. Hours worked per week 41.98 3.66 -.01 -.02 -.10 .03 -.06 -.02 -.08 -.03 -.07 
Foremen-rated variables 4.22 0.66 .06 -.18 .05 -.14 .14 -.15 -.10 -.13 -.01 
25. Opportunity to observe 4.41 0.54 -.05 -.07 -.28 -.26 -.06 -.07 -.27 -.15 -.32 
26. Safety knowledge 4.52 0.47 .01 -.10 -.18 -.09 .09 -.02 -.30 -.02 -.51* 
27. Safety compliance 4.10 0.64 -.09 -.04 -.19 -.26 -.16 -.13 -.19 -.23 -.27 
 
Notes. These numbers are based on 254 employee responses in Site 3; Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are coefficient alphas; N = 32 for 
correlations involving foreman-rated variables. * p ≤ .05, two-tailed. 
 
  
  
 
5
3 
Table 6 continued… 
Variable M SD 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
10. Perceived safety 3.88 0.68 (.89)         
11. Safety anxiety 1.58 0.49 -.35* (.80)        
12. Job satisfaction 4.90 1.19 .36* -.42* (.89)       
13. Life satisfaction 4.73 1.12 .32* -.43* .58* (.84)      
14. Psychological contract 
fulfillment 
4.08 0.61 .59* -.39* .34* .28* (.81)     
15. Safety compliance 4.40 0.54 .42* -.23* .39* .31* .50* (.90)    
16. Safety participation 4.08 0.65 .27* -.04 .23* .14* .36* .53* (.85)   
17. Knowledge of injuries 2.89 6.49 -.10 .23* -.20* -.13 -.10 -.01 -.06 --  
18. Experienced injuries 0.35 1.50 -.07 .20* -.09 -.01 -.09 -.02 -.04 .60* -- 
19. Witnessed injuries 0.51 1.46 -.13 .25* -.24* -.23* -.12 -.02 -.06 .86* .38* 
20. Learned injuries 2.07 4.45 -.07 .11 -.14* -.08 -.05 .01 -.04 .96* .39* 
21. Age 40.47 12.18 -.02 .09 .19* -.05 .03 .08 .15* .00 .16* 
22. Job experience 12.10 10.95 -.08 .12 .07 -.09 -.03 -.03 .09 .02 .18* 
23. Tenure 5.71 6.75 .01 .13 .05 -.05 -.01 .06 .07 .04 .21* 
24. Hours worked per week 41.98 3.66 .03 -.08 .10 .00 .07 -.10 .09 -.09 -.14* 
Foremen-rated variables            
25. Opportunity to observe 4.22 0.66 .35* -.13 -.10 -.44* -.05 -.03 .15 .32 .33 
26. Safety knowledge 4.41 0.54 .32 -.19 .07 -.24 .04 -.06 .27 .25 .31 
27. Safety compliance 4.52 0.47 .35* -.23 .11 .03 .20 .16 .22 .14 .26 
28. Safety participation 4.10 0.64 .19 -.19 .08 -.21 .11 -.01 .18 .26 .31 
 
Notes. These numbers are based on 254 employee responses in Site 3; Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are coefficient alphas; N = 32 for 
correlations involving foreman-rated variables; 
a
 Items assessed using a 4-point scale; 
b
 Items assessed using a 7-point scale. * p ≤ .05, two-tailed. 
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Table 6 continued… 
Variable M SD 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
19. Witnessed injuries 0.51 1.46 --          
20. Learned injuries  2.07 4.45 .79* --         
21. Age 40.47 12.18 -.02 -.05 --        
22. Job experience 12.10 10.95 .02 -.04 .63* --       
23. Tenure 5.71 6.75 -.01 -.02 .47* .57* --      
24. Hours worked per week  41.98  3.66 -.12 -.04 .13 .15* .08 --     
Foremen-rated variables             
25. Opportunity to observe 4.22 0.66 .20 .18 .02 -.07 .07 .28 --    
26. Safety knowledge 4.41 0.54 .09 .14 .05 .08 .09 .23 .71* (.93)   
27. Safety compliance 4.52 0.47 -.05 .10 -.12 .02 -.10 .09 .41* .67* (.92)  
28. Safety participation  4.10 0.64 .10 .16 .11 -.06 .02 .23 .56* .85* .42* (.85) 
 
Notes. These numbers are based on 254 employee responses in Site 3; Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are coefficient alphas; N = 32 for 
correlations involving foreman-rated variables. * p ≤ .05, two-tailed. 
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Figure 4. Single-source structural model results for site 1. Solid lines reflect hypothesized paths whereas dashed lines reflect 
non-hypothesized parameters; all estimates are standardized. N = 168; Psych. safety climate = Psychological safety climate; 
LOC = Locus of control. Results for model fit: χ2(3,698) = 6,555.91, CFI = .75, RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .10. *p ≤ .05. 
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Figure 5. Single-source structural model results for site 2. Solid lines reflect hypothesized paths whereas dashed lines reflect 
non-hypothesized parameters; all estimates are standardized. N = 141; Psych. safety climate = Psychological safety climate; 
LOC = Locus of control. Results for model fit: χ2(3,698) = 7,066.21, CFI = .69, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .13. *p ≤ .05. 
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Figure 6. Single-source structural model results for site 3. Solid lines reflect hypothesized paths whereas dashed lines reflect 
non-hypothesized parameters; all estimates are standardized. N = 199; Psych. safety climate = Psychological safety climate; 
LOC = Locus of control. Results for model fit: χ2(3,698) = 6,439.89, CFI = .77, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .12. *p ≤ .05.
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sites which incorporate foreman-rated employee safety behaviors. For Hypothesis 1, in 
which the knowledge of injuries was posited to share a negative association with 
perceived safety, none of the associations in any site were statistically significant; all 
effects were negative but near-zero in magnitude (β = -.04, ns, site 1; β = -.09, ns, site 2; 
β = -.02, ns, site 3). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not supported—knowledge of injury 
occurrences does not appear to have a meaningful association with perceived safety. 
For Hypothesis 2, which posited a negative association between perceived job 
risk and perceived safety, all three analyses were consistent with expectations. 
Specifically, site 1 (β = -.35, p < .05), site 2 (β = -.43, p < .05), and site 3 (β = -.20, p < 
.05) revealed significant negative associations. Thus, Hypothesis 2 received full support, 
suggesting that greater perceived job risk is associated with reduced perceived safety. 
Hypothesis 3, which posited a positive association between psychological safety 
climate and perceived safety, received mixed support. Sites 1 (β = .27, p < .05) and 3 (β 
= .39, p < .05) both revealed statistically significant positive associations. However, site 
2 revealed an association in the opposite direction (β = -.13, ns) although it was not 
significant. Taken together, these findings provide partial support for Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 4 posited a negative association between trait anxiety and perceived 
safety. Although all associations were negative (β = -.04, ns, site 1; β = -.04, ns, site 2; β 
= -.04, ns, site 3), none were statistically meaningful. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was not 
supported. This suggests that trait anxiety does not have a meaningful association with 
perceived safety. 
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Hypothesis 5 conjectured that there is a positive association between safety locus 
of control and perceived safety. To test this hypothesis, perceived safety’s associations 
with both safety internality and safety externality were assessed. Because higher levels 
of safety internality suggest greater safety locus of control, a positive association was 
expected with perceived safety. However, because higher levels of externality suggest 
lower safety locus of control, a negative association between safety externality and 
perceived safety was expected. For safety internality, only site 2 supported expectations; 
this site revealed a significant positive association (β = .27, p < .05) whereas sites 1 (β = 
.09, ns) and 3 (β = .06, ns) revealed near-zero associations. For safety externality, only 
site 3 supported expectations (β = -.18, p < .05); sites 1 (β = .09, ns) and 2 (β = .05, ns) 
both revealed positive, near-zero associations. Taken together, these results provide only 
limited support for Hypothesis 5 as only two out of six analyses supported expectations. 
Thus, it appears that safety locus of control generally does not share a meaningful 
association with perceived safety. 
Hypothesis 6 conjectured a positive association between safety knowledge and 
perceived safety. Only one of three sites supported this hypothesis. Site 2 revealed a 
significant, positive association (β = .19, p < .05) whereas sites 1 (β = .11, ns) and 3 (β = 
-.07, ns) demonstrated non-significant relationships. Thus, Hypothesis 6 only received 
limited support. 
Perceived safety outcomes. Hypothesis 7 posited a negative association between 
perceived safety and safety-related anxiety. Consistent with expectations, these variables 
revealed significant, negative associations in all three sites (β = -.25, p < .05, site 1; β = -
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.40, p < .05, site 2; β = -.34, p < .05, site 3). Consequently, Hypothesis 7 received full 
support, suggesting that feeling less safe results in higher levels of safety-related anxiety. 
Based on a cybernetic framework, safety-related anxiety was expected to 
subsequently reveal positive associations with both safety compliance (Hypothesis 8a) 
and safety participation (Hypothesis 8b). Because safety behaviors were both employee-
rated and foreman-rated, single-source and self-other results are reported here. Results of 
site-specific analyses using foreman-rated safety behaviors are reported in Table 7; 
analyses using foreman-rated safety behavior combined across all three sites are reported 
in Appendix E for completeness. 
For Hypothesis 8a, none of the sites revealed statistically meaningful single-
source associations between safety-related anxiety and safety compliance (β = -.02, ns, 
site 1; β = .00, ns, site 2; β = .04, ns, site 3). When assessing the relationship between 
employee-reported safety-related anxiety and foreman-reported safety compliance, two 
sites demonstrated positive, non-significant associations (β = .03, ns, site 1; β = .16, ns, 
site 2) and one site revealed a statistically significant, negative association (β = -.41, p < 
.05, site 3). Taken together, analyses using both employee-reported and foreman-
reported safety behavior separately suggest that safety-related anxiety does not share a 
meaningful, positive association with employee safety compliance behaviors. Thus, 
Hypothesis 8a was not supported. 
For Hypothesis 8b, which conjectured a positive relationship between safety-
related anxiety and safety participation, single-source analyses partially supported 
expectations; specifically, site 1 revealed a significant, positive association (β = .15, p <  
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Table 7  
Safety-Related Anxiety Predicting Foreman-Rated Employee Safety Behaviors  
 
Variable
a
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 
Comp. Part. Comp. Part. Comp. Part. 
Psychological safety 
climate 
.40 -.04 -.25 -.23 -.12 -.22 
Safety knowledge -.36 -.24 .24 .24 .08 -.23 
Safety-related anxiety .03 .19 .16 -.01 -.41* -.46* 
 
Notes. Comp. = Safety compliance; Part. = Safety participation; these analyses were tested using full 
information maximum likelihood estimation; site 1, N = 190 (dependent variables N = 22); site 2, N = 151 
(dependent variables N = 19); site 3, N = 254 (dependent variables N = 29). All table entries represent 
standardized estimates. 
a 
Due to limited numbers of foreman ratings within sites, standard errors could not 
be corrected for non-independence to account for ratings nested within foremen. *p ≤ .05. 
 
.05). However, Sites 2 and 3 did not demonstrate statistically meaningful associations (β 
= -.02, ns, Site 2; β = .15, ns, Site 3), although it is noteworthy that Site 3 revealed an 
association of equal magnitude and direction relative to Site 1. When considering the 
association between employee-reported safety-related anxiety and foreman-reported 
safety participation, none of the sites supported expectations with two revealing non-
significant associations (β = .19, ns, site 1; β = -.01, ns, site 2) and one revealing a 
statistically significant, negative association (β = -.46, p < .05, site 3). Taken together, 
although single-source analyses provided some support for Hypothesis 8b, both sets of 
analyses were generally unsupportive. These results suggest that safety-related anxiety 
does not share a consistently positive association with either employee- or foreman-
reported safety participation behaviors. 
  
62 
Ancillary Analyses 
 Importance of feeling safe. As previously noted, one of the core assumptions of 
cybernetic theory applied to perceived safety is that individuals consider feeling safe to 
be important for optimal well-being and functioning at work. To gauge the extent to 
which participants believed this is true, safety threshold was assessed. Three safety 
threshold items were specifically designed to measure the degree to which employees 
considered feeling safe to be critical at work (with higher scores suggesting greater 
perceived importance). Mean responses for this construct across the three sites were 4.20 
(SD = .68), 4.26 (SD = .71), and 4.31 (SD = .67), respectively (all items were rated on a 
five-point agreement scale ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”). 
The magnitude of these means support the assumption that participants generally 
believed feeling safe is important at work.  
Safety’s perceived importance may also influence the strength of the association 
between perceived safety and safety-related anxiety. Specifically, greater perceived 
importance for safety at work would be expected to correspond with a stronger 
relationship between perceived safety and safety-related anxiety; this is because a person 
who believes feeling safe is more critical would be expected to be more distressed when 
feeling unsafe than a person who believes feeling safe is less critical. However, 
perceived safety’s consistent, negative association with safety-related anxiety across all 
three sites suggests that workers were fairly uniform in considering safety to be 
important given that safety’s perceived absence was associated with greater anxiety. The 
magnitudes of safety threshold’s means across sites likewise suggest this.  
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Nevertheless, safety threshold was tested as a moderator of the relationship 
between perceived safety and safety-related anxiety in each site (in addition to main 
effects for perceived safety, safety threshold, and trait anxiety
5
). Results revealed no 
evidence of moderation (B = .16, ns, site 1; B = .00, ns, site 2; B = -.04, ns, site 3). This 
can possibly be attributed to restricted variance in safety threshold perceptions where 
responses may not have been variable enough to demonstrate a moderating effect. 
Ultimately, however, these combined results offer support for the core, underlying 
assumption of this study that individuals generally believe it is important to feel safe at 
work.  
Impression management. A common concern with self-reported data is the 
potential for participants to engage in impression management tactics in an effort to 
display more socially desirable responses (Paulhus & Reid, 1991). To the extent that 
respondents engaged in such efforts, responses would be expected to be biased (Arthur 
& Glaze, 2011; Holden, 2008; Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987). Consequently, impression 
management items were administered to participants to gauge the extent to which they 
share meaningful associations with this study’s core constructs with stronger 
associations suggesting the presence of greater bias.  
Impression management’s intercorrelations with all study variables by site are 
listed in Tables 4 through 6. As can be seen, impression management shared only small 
to moderate correlations with psychological safety climate (.22, .20, .21), perceived 
                                                 
5
 Perceived safety revealed significant, negative main effects (B = -.38, p < .05, site 1; B = -.43, p < .05, 
site 2; B = -.30, p < .05, site 3) and trait anxiety revealed significant, positive main effects (B = .26, p < 
.05, Site 1; B = .20, p < .05, Site 2; B = .22, p < .05, Site 3) on safety-related anxiety whereas safety 
threshold revealed non-significant main effects (B = .11, ns, site 1; B = -.04, ns, site 2; B = .02, ns, site 3) 
across all three sites. These estimates are all unstandardized. 
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safety (.08, .29, .13), safety-related anxiety (-.07, -.07, -.18), safety compliance (.23, .33, 
.30), and safety participation (.19, .37, .16) across the three sites, suggesting that the 
influence of impression management on participant responses was not extreme
6
. Further, 
as noted previously, the poor internal consistency reliabilities for these items across sites 
(α = .56, .66, .63) likewise suggest that participants did not consistently respond to 
impression management items in socially desirable ways. Although lower internal 
consistencies naturally attenuate correlations with other variables, all of the above 
correlations remained small to moderate in magnitude—in accordance with conventional 
effect size heuristics (Cohen, 1988)—after statistically correcting for unreliability. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that impression management was not a meaningful 
source of response bias in the present sample. 
Exploratory Analyses 
 Safety-related anxiety and safety behaviors. The near-zero association 
between safety-related anxiety and safety behaviors may suggest a non-linear 
relationship between the two constructs. In this case, a curvilinear association is 
theoretically plausible; specifically, the relationship between safety-related anxiety and 
safety behavior may follow a quadratic form similar to the classic inverted U shape that 
has traditionally been posited to reflect the relationship between arousal (i.e., stress) and 
performance (e.g., Jex, 1998; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908).  
                                                 
6
 Although it is not uncommon for researchers to attempt to partial out shared variance related to 
impression management (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), such a practice runs the risk of 
eliminating meaningful construct variance and is widely discouraged (Brannick, Chan, Conway, Lance, & 
Spector, 2010; Conway & Lance, 2010; Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 1999; Schmitt & Oswald, 2006). 
Consequently, this was not considered a viable course of action in the present study, especially given that 
impression management did not appear to be a serious source of bias. 
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In the case of perceived safety, particularly low levels of safety-related anxiety 
may fail to motivate the appropriate level of safety behavior because arousal is too low. 
In cybernetic terms, a safety discrepancy would not be detected which would fail to 
motivate corrective action (e.g., changes in safety behavior; Cummings & Cooper, 1979; 
Edwards, 1992). Conversely, more moderate levels of safety-related anxiety may be 
associated with increased safety behavior because of a greater perceived discrepancy 
between current and desired safety (i.e., higher arousal). However, consistent with the 
posited arousal-performance relationship, particularly high levels of safety-related 
anxiety may be associated with lower reported safety behaviors as workers may no 
longer feel it is within their power to alleviate the perceived discrepancy. A reduced 
feeling of control over one’s safety at higher levels of arousal also suggests that safety 
locus of control may be a moderating factor. Consequently, as exploratory examinations 
of safety-related anxiety’s relationships with safety behaviors (i.e., safety compliance 
and participation), two sets of analyses were run. First, polynomial multiple regression 
models with latent variables were estimated to test the form of safety-related anxiety’s 
relationships with both safety compliance and safety participation in each of the three 
sites (resulting in six separate analyses). Second, safety internality and externality were 
tested as moderators of the most explanatory forms (linear or quadratic) of the 
relationships demonstrated between safety-related anxiety and safety behavior in the 
previous analyses.  
Results of these analyses are reported in Table 8. With regard to the form of the 
relationship between safety-related anxiety and safety behavior, polynomial regression  
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Table 8  
Testing the Form of the Relationships between Safety-Related Anxiety and Safety 
Behaviors  
 
Variable 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 
Comp. Part. Comp. Part. Comp. Part. 
Psychological safety 
climate 
.08 .35* .27* .37* .13* .26* 
Safety knowledge .51* .64* .44* .52* .56* .53* 
Safety-related anxiety -.08 .18 -.13 -.26 -.02 .07 
Safety-related anxiety
2
  .10 -.03 .14 .55* .10 .15 
 
Notes. Comp. = Safety compliance; Part. = Safety participation; Safety-related anxiety
2
 = Squared term; 
site 1, N = 190; site 2, N = 151; site 3, N = 254. All table entries represent unstandardized estimates 
because standardized estimates could not be estimated when testing latent variable interactions. Standard 
errors of model parameter estimates may not be trustworthy for sites 1 and 2 due to small sample sizes. *p 
≤ .05. 
 
results were generally unsupportive. Although one analysis revealed a statistically 
significant, positive quadratic term (B = .55, p < .05, participation, Site 2), the remaining 
five analyses failed to provide evidence of curvilinear associations. Interestingly, the 
significant positive quadratic term with safety participation in Site 2 suggests that at 
higher levels of safety-related anxiety, workers reported working more safely. This is 
contrary to the expectation that higher levels of safety-related anxiety would be 
associated with lower reported safety behavior. Given the general lack of support for a 
curvilinear association, safety internality and externality were tested as moderators to 
determine the extent to which they provide additional explanatory power concerning the 
relationships between safety-related anxiety and safety behavior. 
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To ensure that the most appropriate forms of safety-related anxiety’s 
relationships with safety behaviors were tested, the higher order regression terms that 
were most explanatory (i.e., linear or quadratic) from the previous analyses were tested 
in each respective model. Specifically, linear relationships were tested for all 
relationships with the exception of site 2 where a quadratic relationship was tested for 
safety participation and safety-related anxiety. Results from these analyses are provided 
in Table 9. Findings revealed that neither safety internality nor safety externality were 
meaningful moderators of the linear or quadratic relationships. It is noteworthy, 
however, that safety internality revealed significant, positive main effects on safety 
behavior in two analyses (B = .23, p < .05, participation, site 1; B = .17, p < .05, 
compliance, site 2) and a nearly-significant main effect in one other (B = .11, p < .10, 
compliance, site 1). These findings support previous research which has found 
associations between safety locus of control and safety behavior (Christian et al., 2009) 
that suggest workers with higher safety locus of control tend to work more safely.  
Attitudinal outcomes of perceived safety. Although perceived safety revealed 
consistent, negative associations with safety-related anxiety in support of theoretical 
expectations, relevant attitudinal outcomes beyond the explanatory bounds of cybernetic 
theory were included in survey administrations as well to provide additional evidence of 
perceived safety’s implications for employee well-being. Specifically, constructs 
associated with workers’ satisfaction with their organization (i.e., perceived 
psychological contract fulfillment concerning safety), job (i.e., job satisfaction), and life 
(i.e., life satisfaction) were included and tested as correlates of perceived safety with the  
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Table 9 
Testing Safety Internality and Externality as Moderators of the Relationships between 
Safety-Related Anxiety and Safety Behaviors 
 
Variable 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 
Comp. Part. Comp. Part. Comp. Part. 
Psychological safety 
climate 
.08 .35* .26* .37* .14* .25* 
Safety knowledge .48* .57* .43* .43* .54* .45* 
Safety-related anxiety -.06 .15 -.05 -.23 .01 .12 
Safety-related anxiety
2
     .57*   
Internality .11 .23* .17* .03 .02 .18 
Externality -.04 .09 -.08 .13 -.07 -.20 
Safety-related anxiety 
x Internality
a
 
-.11 -.24 -.09  -.03 .17 
Safety-related anxiety 
x Externality 
-.05 -.39 .08  .19 .54 
Safety-related anxiety
2
 
x Internality 
   .51   
Safety-related anxiety
2
 
x Externality 
   -.57   
 
Notes. Comp. = Safety compliance; Part. = Safety participation; Safety-related anxiety
2
 = Squared term; 
site 1, N = 190; site 2, N = 151; site 3, N = 254. All table entries represent unstandardized estimates 
because standardized estimates could not be estimated when testing latent variable interactions. Standard 
errors of model parameter estimates may not be trustworthy for sites 1 and 2 due to small sample sizes.  
a
 Safety-related anxiety x Internality (Externality) = An estimated interaction effect between these two 
variables. *p ≤ .05. 
 
expectation that greater perceived safety would be associated with more favorable 
perceptions in all three areas. Results of these analyses are provided in Table 10.  
Relevant covariates of each of these attitudinal variables were included in the analyzed 
models. Specifically, trait anxiety and safety locus of control (i.e., safety internality and  
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Table 10 
Testing Attitudinal Outcomes of Perceived Safety 
 
Variable 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 
PCF JS LS PCF JS LS PCF JS LS 
Psych. safety 
climate 
.36*   .50*   .31*   
Job 
satisfaction 
-.05  .62* .10  .42* .10  .64* 
Life 
satisfaction 
.27* .65*  -.04 .40*  -.06 .56*  
Psych. 
contract 
fulfillment 
 .06 .18*  .22* -.02  .13 -.05 
Internality .04 .10 -.02 .07 .14 -.08 .10 .02 .05 
Externality -.07 .02 .06 -.08 -.14 .01 -.13* .08 -.02 
Trait anxiety .16* -.09 -.11 .15* -.18* -.16 .01 -.14* -.09 
Job tenure -.03 .01 -.01 -.07 .07 -.05 .01 .04 -.04 
Perceived 
safety 
.37* -.03 .04 .40* -.09 .25* .49* .16 .06 
Notes. Psych. safety climate = Psychological safety climate; Psych. contract fulfillment = Psychological 
contract fulfillment; PCF = Psychological contract fulfillment; JS = Job satisfaction; LS = Life 
satisfaction. All table entries represent standardized estimates; site 1, N = 178; site 2, N = 141; site 3, N = 
219. *p ≤ .05. 
 
externality) were included as covariates in each model as these variables were expected 
to affect satisfaction ratings. Each model also included the other satisfaction variables as 
covariates as these variables are naturally expected to share meaningful variance with 
each other. Psychological safety climate was included as a covariate for psychological 
contract fulfillment because of its heavy emphasis on management commitment to safety 
which could affect perceptions concerning the organization’s psychological contract 
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fulfillment regarding safety. Tenure was also included as a covariate as individuals who 
stay longer could be expected to have greater satisfaction in all three areas. 
Results revealed that perceived safety was positively associated with 
psychological contract fulfillment in all three sites (β = .37, p < .05, site 1; β = .40, p < 
.05, p < .05, site 2; β = .49, p < .05, site 3). Conversely, perceived safety was only 
significantly associated with life satisfaction in one analysis (β = .25, p < .05, site 2) and 
demonstrated no statistically significant associations with job satisfaction. In sum, 
although there was little support for perceived safety sharing meaningful associations 
with job and life satisfaction, perceived safety was meaningfully associated with 
employee reports of their organization’s psychological contract fulfillment concerning 
safety. The implications of these findings along with the findings associated with this 
study’s formal hypotheses are delineated in the sections that follow. 
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DISCUSSION 
 People have a basic psychological need to feel that they are free from physical 
harm or danger (Higgins, 2000; Maslow, 1943; Pittman & Zeigler, 2007; Pyszczynski et 
al., 1997). Given that need fulfillment is a major antecedent of individual well-being and 
a consistent motivator of behavior (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Diefendorff & Chandler, 2011; 
Tay & Diener, 2011), an individual’s appraisal of the extent to which the need for safety 
is fulfilled (i.e., perceived safety) in the context of work thus has important individual 
and organizational implications. Consequently, the purpose of this study was to 
introduce the construct of perceived safety and empirically examine its implications in 
the workplace. Using cybernetic theory as a guiding framework, this study specifically 
sought to examine meaningful antecedents of perceived safety to determine how this 
perception is formed and to test perceived safety’s associations with both employee 
well-being and safety behaviors as theoretically relevant outcomes.  
With regard to the antecedents of perceived safety, results revealed that 
perceived job risk and psychological safety climate were the most robust predictors. 
Both constructs revealed meaningful associations with perceived safety in all or a 
majority of the three examined work sites. Worker safety knowledge and safety locus of 
control were somewhat less robust as predictors and only revealed significant 
associations in a third of the analyses conducted. In addition, neither trait anxiety nor 
knowledge of workplace injuries shared any statistically significant associations with 
perceived safety, suggesting that these variables are not meaningful antecedents.  
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In accordance with expectations, analyses of theorized outcomes of perceived 
safety revealed that perceived safety and safety-related anxiety were consistently 
negatively related across all three sites. This supports the expectation under cybernetic 
theory that a perceived safety discrepancy is psychologically troubling and leads to 
greater safety-related anxiety. Contrary to theoretical expectations, however, safety-
related anxiety did not share consistent, positive associations with self- or foreman-
reported safety compliance and participation behaviors. Although safety-related anxiety 
shared a significant positive association with self-reported safety participation in one site 
and a positive, albeit non-significant, association of the same magnitude with safety 
participation in another site, there was no support for an association between safety-
related anxiety and safety compliance across the three sites. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that although a perceived safety discrepancy (low perceived safety) 
appears to be anxiety-inducing, workers may not consistently adjust their safety behavior 
to alleviate the perceived discrepancy. The theoretical and practical implications of these 
findings in addition to exploratory findings are addressed next. 
Theoretical Implications of Cybernetics and Safety 
 Although researchers have used cybernetic principles to explain a number of 
psychological and behavioral phenomena both inside and outside of the workplace (e.g., 
Carver & Scheier, 1982; Cummings & Cooper, 1979; Edwards, 1992), this study 
constitutes the first known attempt to use a cybernetic framework to describe the 
psychological appraisal of perceived safety. Using cybernetic theory as the theoretical 
foundation, a number of individual and contextual variables were posited to act as 
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antecedents of workers’ appraisals of perceived safety. Of these variables, results 
revealed that the examined contextual variables (i.e., psychological safety climate, 
perceived job risk) were more consistently efficacious in explaining variance in 
perceived safety than the individual difference variables (i.e., trait anxiety, safety locus 
of control, safety knowledge). This suggests that the social context and nature of the job 
itself have a greater influence on perceived safety than the individual differences that 
were expected to have an effect. Further, although knowledge of workplace injuries was 
not meaningfully associated with workers’ perceived safety, the severity, recency, and 
attribution of those injuries could each affect the extent to which injury knowledge 
affects perceived safety. Testing such factors as moderators could reveal instances in 
which the knowledge of injuries may be more strongly associated with perceived safety 
than these results suggest. 
Cybernetic theory also suggests that a perceived safety discrepancy (i.e., low 
perceived safety) is psychologically troubling. Whereas results firmly supported this 
proposition, it is noteworthy that safety behaviors—compliance in particular—did not 
consistently appear to represent corrective actions designed to alleviate safety-related 
anxiety as expected. The failure to support this proposition, however, does not mean 
cybernetic theory is deficient in describing individuals’ responses to safety-related 
anxiety. There are two potential explanations for these findings which I elaborate on 
next.  
First, to the extent that employees were already behaving safely—which high 
self- and foreman-rated mean safety behavior ratings suggest was the case—it would not 
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necessarily be reasonable to expect that a change in safety behavior would alleviate 
safety-related anxiety. This is perhaps particularly true for safety compliance as there are 
likely fewer means of altering rule-following behaviors relative to more discretionary 
and non-prescribed safety participation behaviors. If behaviors are already in-line with 
known safety rules then there is little else with regard to compliance that a worker can 
adjust to relieve anxiety. Correspondingly, it is noteworthy that this study’s results 
revealed more restricted variance in both employee- and foreman-rated safety 
compliance behaviors in comparison to safety participation behaviors across all three 
sites. This may explain why there was no support for an association between safety-
related anxiety and safety compliance and why there was some support for a positive 
association between safety-related anxiety and safety participation. Workers naturally 
have greater capability of enhancing their discretionary safety behaviors when they 
experience greater safety anxiety relative to more prescribed, rule-following behaviors. 
Nevertheless, it is still noteworthy that safety-related anxiety and safety participation did 
not consistently share meaningful, positive associations.  
A second explanation for not finding consistent, positive associations between 
safety-related anxiety and safety behavior is that workers may use different means of 
corrective action when faced with safety-related anxiety. In discussing the relevance of 
cybernetic theory to occupational stress, Edwards (1992) outlined a number of different 
types of coping strategies (i.e., corrective actions) that can be taken to respond to 
perceived discrepancies and enhance well-being: problem-focused coping, appraisal-
focused coping, and emotion-focused coping. Changing safety behaviors to alleviate a 
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safety discrepancy represents a problem-focused coping strategy (Edwards, 1992; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Such strategies involve direct attempts to change the 
situation that causes anxiety. However, as already discussed, participants generally did 
not report engaging in greater safety behaviors when feeling less safe. Consequently, 
alternative coping strategies may have been seen by workers as more effective means of 
alleviating safety-related anxiety. 
Appraisal-focused coping strategies represent attempts to cognitively reduce the 
importance of a particular discrepancy (Edwards, 1992; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). In 
the case of perceived safety, this would involve discounting the value of feeling safe (or 
conversely, the detriment of feeling unsafe). However, given the perceived importance 
of safety demonstrated in these data, and the fact that safety is widely considered to be a 
universal psychological need (Higgins, 2000; Maslow, 1943; Pittman & Zeigler, 2007; 
Pyszczynski et al., 1997), such a coping strategy seems unlikely. Alternative coping 
strategies that are perhaps more likely in response to safety-related anxiety are emotion-
focused coping strategies (Edwards, 1992; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Such strategies 
represent direct attempts by individuals to improve well-being independent of the source 
of anxiety. Positive, emotion-focused strategies represent efforts to improve 
psychological and/or physical well-being and could include efforts such as relaxation 
and meditation (Newman & Beehr, 1979). Conversely, negative, emotion-focused 
strategies, which may temporarily help psychological well-being but damage physical 
well-being, could include behaviors such as increased alcohol consumption and smoking 
(Edwards, 1992). More research is needed to explore these coping strategies individually 
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and in combination to determine which is the most frequent and effective response to 
safety-related anxiety and under what circumstances these coping strategies may change. 
Can Feeling Safe Be Unsafe? 
 An additional and seemingly counterintuitive implication of cybernetic theory 
applied to perceived safety is that feeling safer is expected to lead to reduced safety 
behaviors. This is expected due to the mediating influence of safety-related anxiety. 
Feeling unsafe is posited to enhance safety-related anxiety which, theoretically, is 
posited to increase safety behaviors in a direct effort to relieve the anxiety. Although 
results generally did not support a positive association between safety-related anxiety 
and safety behavior (safety compliance in particular), there was some evidence that 
greater safety-related anxiety is associated with increased safety participation behaviors. 
The occupational health psychology literature provides indirect empirical support for 
this general proposition as well. Specifically, in a meta-analysis of the relationship 
between perceived risk and health behavior, Brewer et al. (2007) found that greater 
perceived risk of disease was associated with increased vaccination behavior. The 
direction of these results likewise suggests that given lower perceived risk (i.e., higher 
perceived safety) individuals are less likely to engage in preventative health behaviors. 
This lends some credence to the notion that feeling safe can actually be less safe.  
Cybernetic theory offers further explanation for this phenomenon and posits that 
a specific need or end-state in equilibrium (i.e., where current and desired states 
correspond) will lie dormant and be subordinate to other needs or goals until an event 
cognitively triggers a discrepancy (Cummings & Cooper, 1979; Lord et al., 2010). Thus, 
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in the absence of a perceived safety discrepancy an individual is expected to have less 
motivation to alter (i.e., improve) their safety behaviors (assuming they have the ability 
to do so). In fact, feeling that the need for safety is fully met could even lead to a 
decrease in safety behaviors to conserve personal resources given that safety would 
represent a less salient concern and would be expected to require less effort to maintain 
(Miller, 1965).  
Such expectations (and subsequent behaviors) have the possibility of being 
exacerbated due to the reality that accidents and injuries are low base-rate events (Hulin 
& Rousseau, 1980; Jacobs, 1970) which often do not co-occur when safety rules are 
ignored or when blatantly unsafe acts are committed (Reason, 2000). The frequent 
absence of negative consequences associated with unsafe behaviors or safety omissions 
effectively reinforces the continued commission (or omission) of those behaviors, 
potentially leading to increased feelings of complacency or invulnerability (Perloff, 
1983). Thus, over time it is possible that feeling safe could reduce safety behaviors even 
further to the extent that the reduction in safety behavior does not result in accident or 
injury. 
This suggests that there is value in individuals feeling unsafe to a certain degree 
when working—or at least being reminded of the salience of certain job risks. This 
should be particularly true for individuals who work in more dangerous or risky 
circumstances in which the consequences of error are more severe. In much the same 
way that the perceived risk of illness motivates the pursuit of vaccination (Brewer et al., 
2007), feeling less safe (i.e., more at risk) would be expected to enhance vigilance and 
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rule-following and thus reduce errors and shortcuts as direct means of avoiding physical 
harm. Interestingly, although theory on arousal and performance would suggest that 
particularly high levels of anxiety should reduce performance (Jex, 1998; Yerkes & 
Dodson, 1908), the one instance in this study’s analyses where a significant curvilinear 
association was revealed between safety-related anxiety and safety participation revealed 
that at higher levels of safety-related anxiety, safety participation increased even more 
dramatically. This provides further support for the implication that it is potentially safer 
for workers to feel unsafe to a certain degree. 
Nevertheless, although these analyses revealed some support for reduced 
perceived safety and subsequent safety-related anxiety increasing safety participation, 
there are negative correlates of workplace anxiety or strain that would call into question 
the appropriateness of promoting its presence by causing workers to feel less safe. For 
example, in the present study, safety-related anxiety revealed moderate, negative 
associations with perceptions of psychological contract fulfillment, job satisfaction, and 
life satisfaction (see Tables 4-6). Further, a meta-analysis by Darr and Johns (2008) 
revealed that greater work strain was associated with increased psychological and 
physical illness and absenteeism. However, although the negative outcomes of feeling 
unsafe are noteworthy, the negative outcomes associated with workplace accidents and 
injuries are often more immediately damaging for both the individuals involved (e.g., 
hospitalization, permanent or long-term disability, loss of income) and the employing 
organization (e.g., equipment damage, reputational damage, workers compensation 
costs). Consequently, there is merit for organizations to do whatever is feasible to ensure 
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that employees work as safely as possible. Any efforts to increase vigilance and safety 
behavior by causing employees to feel less safe should nevertheless be approached with 
care given the potentially negative outcomes of doing so. Possible means of promoting 
healthy levels of safety-related anxiety are discussed in the following section. 
Practical Implications 
 The psychological literature on fear arousal offers some idea as to how an 
organization could promote the appropriate levels of safety anxiety sufficient to 
encourage workers to engage in necessary safety behaviors. According to fear arousal 
theory, fear—a perceived threat to values or needs—induces arousal or anxiety (Chu, 
1966). The probability that an individual takes action to reduce this anxiety is considered 
to be a positive function of three primary cognitions: the perceived magnitude or severity 
of the potential loss/event, the likelihood of the potential loss/event, and the perceived 
efficacy of preventing the potential loss/event (Chu, 1966; Rogers, 1983). An 
organization could thus be effective in motivating specific safety behaviors to the extent 
it is able to affect safety-related anxiety through these three cognitions.  
For example, in the chemical processing industry, lockout-tagout procedures 
represent important safe-guards that can prevent dangerous events from occurring when 
conducting routine or scheduled maintenance on machines. According to fear arousal 
research, an organization seeking to improve adherence to these procedures could 
improve compliance by informing workers of (1) the severity of outcomes associated 
with failing to follow lockout-tagout procedures (e.g., personal injury, chemical release, 
equipment damage), (2) the likelihood of such outcomes occurring if procedures are not 
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followed, and (3) the efficacy of the recommended solution (i.e., following lockout-
tagout procedures) in preventing the associated outcomes. Past research has shown that 
of these three cognitions, perceived efficacy in taking a recommended course of action is 
particularly effective in motivating corrective action (Chu, 1966; Rogers & Mewborn, 
1976). Thus, although it is beneficial to reiterate to workers the severity and likelihood 
of negative outcomes given the presence or absence of certain behaviors, it is perhaps 
more important to emphasize to workers that it is within their capabilities to take action 
to prevent these negative outcomes from occurring. Such a feeling of efficacy could 
counteract anxiety to a certain degree while also facilitating the desired safety behaviors. 
 There are other practical implications of this study’s findings as well. For one, it 
is noteworthy that one of the factors that was most influential in informing workers’ 
perceived safety was psychological safety climate. Whereas perceived job risk was also 
a meaningful antecedent, organizations have greater power to affect changes in safety 
climate than they generally do with regard to job risk. For example, although coal miners 
cannot help the fact that traveling down narrow mine shafts and working underground is 
part of their job description, it is still possible for a mining crew to foster a favorable 
safety climate despite the risks inherent to their job. Thus, organizations can improve 
perceived safety and stem unnecessary safety-related anxiety by working to demonstrate 
that safety has a greater organizational priority. One of the key means of doing so is to 
ensure that the appropriate behaviors are reinforced and supported. This could include 
praising safe working procedures and rewarding safety even when under time 
constraints. Such actions communicate to employees that safety truly has precedence 
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over other organizational priorities (Zohar, 2008). The added value of improving safety 
climate is underscored by this study’s non-hypothesized finding that psychological 
safety climate shared direct, positive associations with self-reported safety compliance 
and participation. This is consistent with safety climate theory and research which 
emphasize its importance as a predictor of worker safety behaviors (Christian et al., 
2009; Zohar, 2003). 
 Exploratory analyses also revealed that internal safety locus of control revealed a 
number of meaningful, positive associations with safety behavior. Such a finding—that 
greater perceived control over workplace safety is associated with increased safety 
behaviors—is consistent with past findings regarding generalized locus of control (e.g., 
Christian et al., 2009). This has potential implications for personnel selection such that it 
may be advantageous for organizations to consider applicants’ levels of internal safety 
locus of control as a predictor of future safety behaviors.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 There are some limitations of the present study that should be noted. First, the 
majority of this study’s variables were assessed solely via self-reports, with the 
exception of worker safety knowledge and safety behavior (i.e., compliance and 
participation) which were assessed by both employees and foremen. However, self-
reports necessarily constituted the primary source of data because of this study’s focus 
on worker perceptions. Such a decision was justified because there is no more accurate 
or reasonable means to assess constructs such as perceived safety or safety-related 
anxiety than through workers’ self-reports.  
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An additional limitation is that the majority of this study’s variables were 
assessed concurrently (the exception being the foreman-rated variables). However, 
although the issues associated with cross-sectional designs are noteworthy (e.g., 
concerns regarding temporal precedence/reverse-causation; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 
2002; Stone-Romero, 2011), there were not cogent theoretical reasons to separate the 
measurement of this study’s variables in time for this initial examination. Although 
associations were posited to exist along a number of causal pathways (e.g., knowledge of 
injuriesperceived safety) that naturally presuppose temporal precedence, these causal 
processes should already have been underway at the time of their measurement. That is, 
workers should already have perceived their safety level to be a function of the work 
context (e.g., injuries, perceived job risk) and the subsequent causal process relating 
perceived safety to safety-related anxiety and safety behavior was expected to be in a 
state of equilibrium at the time the variables were assessed. Further, it was important 
first to establish that the posited associations existed concurrently before examining how 
such relations unfold over time (Shadish et al., 2002; Spector, 2002).  
In light of this, given this study’s findings demonstrating concurrent associations 
between perceived safety and theoretically-relevant antecedents and outcomes, the 
important next step is to consider the temporal dynamism of these constructs—with a 
particular focus on perceived safety. A useful means of exploring the dynamism of 
perceived safety and its interrelations with other variables is to use the experience 
sampling method in which construct measurement occurs at numerous points over a 
particular period of time (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987). Such a method could be 
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used to determine the extent to which perceived safety varies within months, weeks, or 
even days. This represents an important issue for future research to consider. 
 The combination of the preceding two limitations (i.e., the use of concurrent, 
self-reported data) likewise raises concerns regarding common method bias (Conway & 
Lance, 2010; Spector, 2006)—specifically, that relationships between self-reported 
variables will be spuriously high due to shared method-related variance (cf. Campbell, 
1982; Podsakoff et al., 2003). However, a recent examination of the effects of common 
method variance across multiple studies revealed that although there was evidence of 
minor inflation in observed relationships, this effect was almost fully counteracted by 
attenuation due to measurement error (Lance, Dawson, Birkelbach, & Hoffman, 2010). 
This evidence suggests that common method variance, offset by measurement 
unreliability, does not alter true score correlations as has commonly been supposed. 
Nevertheless, Conway and Lance (2010) noted that researchers should still proactively 
attempt to minimize the possibility for method-related bias, particularly with self-
reported survey data.  
Accordingly, there were a number of steps outlined by Podsakoff et al. (2003) 
that were taken to reduce the plausibility of method-related response biases in the 
present study. First, scale endpoints and formats for predictor and criterion variables 
were varied to avoid item anchoring effects. For example, a five-point agreement scale 
was used for perceived safety whereas a four-point agreement scale with different 
anchors was used for safety-related anxiety; these constructs were visually separated into 
distinct tables and incorporated different response instructions to further disrupt item 
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anchoring effects. Second, item complexity and ambiguity were reduced as much as 
possible to alleviate reliance on individual heuristics or guessing. This was accomplished 
by using previously-administered and validated items where feasible and by having 
organizational representatives carefully review items for readability and relevance to the 
targeted sample. Third, participants were assured of the confidentiality of their responses 
both verbally and in writing and were explicitly encouraging to provide honest 
responses. Finally, impression management items were administered and correlated with 
study variables to gauge the extent to which respondents appeared to engage in socially 
desirable response patterns. As previously noted, small to moderate correlations between 
impression management and this study’s core constructs suggest that this was not the 
case. Thus, in conjunction with the previously-cited research (i.e., Lance et al., 2010) 
which provides evidence to suggest that the effects of common method bias may not be 
as extreme as generally supposed, the combination of the above efforts mitigates the 
concern of common method bias even further in the present sample.  
 Although this study makes a number of important contributions to the extant 
occupational safety literature, future research is needed to add greater understanding in a 
number of areas. For one, the sample used in this study (i.e., production/manufacturing 
workers) was relatively narrow. Additional research is needed to expand these 
hypotheses to other working contexts. Considering individuals who work in more 
hazardous or unpredictable environments is particularly important. For example, 
perceived safety (and conversely, perceived risk) has important implications for law 
enforcement personnel as it could affect decision-making in life-or-death situations. A 
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police officer who is either too complacent or too anxious may be more prone to costly 
mistakes. Similarly, considering the implications of perceived safety (or a lack thereof) 
for military personnel and civilian contractors who work in war zones or hostile 
environments would be particularly applicable as the consequences for inappropriately 
handled safety matters in such situations can be extreme.  
 It was noted previously that future research should consider the use of emotion-
focused coping strategies in response to safety-related anxiety. In addition, although 
safety-related anxiety was not consistently associated with safety behaviors in the 
present study, it may be beneficial to consider safety behavior in different ways. Given 
that variance in safety compliance in particular is generally expected to be restricted to 
some degree, greater emphasis should be placed on more discretionary or participative 
safety behaviors. It is possible that the safety participation measure used in this study 
was too generalized to capture the range of behaviors workers engage in as a response to 
safety-related anxiety. Using a more detailed measure of safety participation, or 
citizenship, such as the multi-faceted measure developed by Hofmann, Morgeson, and 
Gerras (2003) may help to address this issue. Further, it may be beneficial to tailor safety 
behavior measures to be specifically applicable to the examined context. Qualitative 
methods such as interviews with subject matter experts could be used to create such 
context-specific measures of safety behavior. Such additional research efforts are needed 
to determine more confidently the extent to which safety-related anxiety affects (or fails 
to affect) safety behavior. 
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Finally, this study’s findings also suggest the need for future research to 
investigate more proximal potential outcomes of safety-related anxiety. For example, a 
possible mediating mechanism between safety-related anxiety and safety behavior is 
safety vigilance. Vigilance constitutes enhanced awareness and a readiness to respond 
(Meyer & Lavin, 2005; Scott, Rogers, Hwang, & Zhang, 2006) that should be 
heightened with lower perceived safety and enhanced safety-related anxiety. Safety 
vigilance may represent a more consistently efficacious problem-focused coping strategy 
given that altering safety behaviors may not always be required or feasible when 
increased safety-related anxiety is experienced; that is, increased safety vigilance may be 
sufficient in alleviating perceived safety discrepancies. In summary, more research is 
clearly needed to determine more concretely how individuals respond when perceived 
safety discrepancies trigger safety-related anxiety. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study provides a number of important contributions to the extant 
occupational safety literature. First, the construct of perceived safety and its role as an 
appraisal of need fulfillment was introduced; the lack of consideration for this construct 
in the psychological literature was a glaring omission in the needed effort to understand 
the psychology of safety at work. Further, using cybernetic theory as a guiding 
framework, this study identified specific factors (psychological safety climate, perceived 
job risk) that act as inputs to perceived safety and also demonstrated perceived safety’s 
meaningful, negative association with safety-related anxiety. Although increased safety-
related anxiety did not appear to consistently trigger changes in safety behavior as was 
expected under cybernetic theory, recommendations for future research were given to 
guide future efforts to determine why this was the case. Ultimately, the theory and 
findings of this study underscore the need for safety researchers to consider the construct 
of perceived safety and its implications for both individual and workplace safety. 
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE MEAN COMPARISONS OF EMPLOYEES WHO DID AND DID NOT 
REPORT IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS 
 
  Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 
Variable 
Yes 
(N = 161) 
No 
(N = 29) 
Yes 
(N = 88) 
No 
(N = 63) 
Yes 
(N = 161) 
No 
(N = 29) 
Psych. Safety 
climate 
3.67 3.51 4.00 3.81 3.95* 3.80 
Job risk 2.71 2.99 2.92 3.04 2.94 2.92 
Trait anxiety 2.54 2.61 2.45 2.43 2.44 2.48 
Int. LOC 3.72 3.63 3.98* 3.75 3.79 3.63 
Ext. LOC 2.68 2.90 2.36 2.55 2.53 2.62 
Safety 
knowledge 
4.34 4.32 4.13 4.24 4.50 4.40 
Perceived safety 3.95* 3.62 4.25 4.09 3.98* 3.77 
Safety anxiety 1.63 1.81 1.43 1.51 1.55 1.60 
Safety 
compliance 
4.19 4.10 4.51* 4.32 4.45 4.35 
Safety 
participation 
3.82 3.71 4.16 4.08 4.05 4.11 
Impression 
management 
3.83 3.77 4.01 3.91 3.87 3.80 
 
Notes.  Mean comparisons were made using independent samples t-tests; bolded values represent mean  
 
comparisons that were statistically significant. *p < .05, two-tailed. 
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APPENDIX B 
LIST OF VARIABLES ASSESSED AND THEIR SOURCES, RATING SCALES, 
AND ITEMS 
(presented in alphabetical order based on variable name) 
 
Dutifulness (International Personality Item Pool [IPIP] items assessing Costa & 
McCrae’s [1992] NEO-PI-R dutifulness facet; Instructions asked respondents to describe 
how accurately the statements below describe them using a 1-5 scale with anchors 
corresponding to “Very inaccurate,” “Moderately inaccurate,” Neither inaccurate nor 
accurate,” “Moderately accurate,” and “Very accurate,” respectively) 
1. Believe laws should be strictly enforced. 
2. Try to follow the rules. 
3. Respect authority 
4. Stick to the rules. 
5. Do things by the book. 
6. Follow directions. 
 
Impression management (IPIP items; Instructions asked respondents to describe how 
accurately the statements below describe them using a 1-5 scale with anchors 
corresponding to “Very inaccurate,” “Moderately inaccurate,” Neither inaccurate nor 
accurate,” “Moderately accurate,” and “Very accurate,” respectively) 
1. Believe there is never an excuse for lying. 
2. Always admit it when I make a mistake. 
3. Rarely overindulge. 
4. Have sometimes had to tell a lie. (R) 
 
Job satisfaction (Agho, Price, & Mueller, 1992) 
(1-7 scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) 
1. I find real enjoyment in my job. 
2. I like my job better than the average person. 
3. I am seldom bored with my job. 
4. I would not consider taking another kind of job. 
5. Most days I am enthusiastic about my job. 
6. I feel fairly well satisfied with my job. 
 
Knowledge of injuries (created for this study) 
1. How many times have you been injured in this job? 
2. How many times have you personally witnessed a co-worker get injured in this job? 
3. How many co-worker injuries have you learned about in this job that you did not 
personally witness? 
 
Life satisfaction (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) 
(1-7 scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) 
1. In most ways my life is close to ideal. 
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2. The conditions of my life are excellent. 
3. I am satisfied with my life. 
4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life. 
5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing. 
 
Perceived job risk (Jermier, Gaines, & McIntosh, 1989) 
(1-5 scale ranging from “almost always untrue” to “almost always true”) 
1. I encounter personally hazardous situations while at work. 
2. My job is physically dangerous. 
3. I am directly exposed to physical harm in carrying out my job. 
 
Perceived safety (created for this study) 
(1-5 scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) 
1. I feel safe at my workplace. 
2. I do not worry about being injured when I am at work. 
3. I am confident that I am safe when I am at work. 
4. I feel that I am free from harm at my workplace. 
5. My need for safety is fulfilled at work. 
6. At work, my need for safety is satisfied. 
 
Psychological contract fulfillment (derived from Robinson & Morrison, 2000 to be 
safety-specific) 
(1-5 scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) 
1. My employer has kept its promise to uphold workplace safety. 
2. I feel that my employer has come through in fulfilling its responsibility to provide a 
safe working environment. 
3. My employer has failed in its obligation to provide a safe working environment. (R) 
4. So far my employer has done an excellent job of meeting its obligation to ensure a 
safe workplace. 
 
Psychological safety climate (Beus, Payne, & Arthur, 2011) 
(1-5 scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) 
Management commitment to safety: 
1. My supervisor strictly enforces the safe working procedures in my workgroup. 
2. My supervisor takes a proactive stance when it comes to safety. 
3. My supervisor demonstrates leadership by keeping people focused on safety. 
4. My supervisor takes the lead on safety issues. 
5. My supervisor is committed to improving safety. 
6. My supervisor places a strong emphasis on workplace health and safety. 
Safety communication: 
7. Safety problems are openly discussed between my supervisor and my workgroup. 
8. My workgroup gets timely feedback on safety issues we have raised with our 
supervisor. 
9. My supervisor keeps my workgroup informed of safety rules. 
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10. Changes in procedures and their effects on safety are effectively communicated by 
my supervisor. 
Safety training: 
11. There is adequate safety training in my workgroup. 
12. My supervisor provides safety training when employees change work tasks. 
13. My supervisor invests a lot of time in employee safety training. 
14. My supervisor trains employees to be safe. 
Coworker safety practices: 
15. My co-workers always follow safety procedures. 
16. My co-workers are quick to point out unsafe conditions. 
17. My co-workers take safety very seriously. 
18. My co-workers are committed to safety improvement. 
Safety equipment/housekeeping: 
19. My supervisor provides sufficient safety equipment for employees. 
20. My supervisor provides safe working conditions. 
21. My supervisor checks equipment to make sure it is free of faults. 
22. Unsafe conditions are promptly corrected in my work area. 
Safety involvement: 
23. My supervisor consults with employees regularly about workplace health and safety 
issues. 
24. My supervisor promotes employees’ involvement in safety related matters. 
25. My supervisor values employees’ ideas about improving safety and health. 
26. My supervisor encourages employees to become involved in safety matters. 
Safety rewards: 
27. The reward system in my workgroup promotes high performance only when work is 
conducted safely. 
28. My supervisor rewards safe behaviors. 
29. My supervisor praises safe work behavior. 
30. In my workgroup, employees who work safely get recognition. 
 
Safety compliance (self-reported; Griffin & Neal, 2000) 
(1-5 scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) 
1. I carry out my work in a safe manner. 
2. I use all the necessary safety equipment to do my job. 
3. I use the correct safety procedures for carrying out my job. 
4. I ensure the highest levels of safety when I carry out my job. 
 
Safety compliance (foreman-reported; Griffin & Neal, 2000) 
(1-5 scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) 
1. This employee carries out his/her work in a safe manner. 
2. This employee uses all the necessary safety equipment to do his/her job. 
3. This employee uses the correct safety procedures for carrying out his/her job. 
4. This employee ensures the highest levels of safety when s/he carries out his/her job. 
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Safety knowledge (self-reported; items 1-4, Griffin & Neal, 2000; items 5 and 6, added 
by the participating organization) 
(1-5 scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) 
1. I know how to perform my job in a safe manner. 
2. I know how to use safety equipment and standard work procedures. 
3. I know how to maintain or improve workplace health and safety. 
4. I know how to reduce the risk of accidents and incidents in the workplace. 
5. I know which safety requirements apply to my work. 
6. I know where to find company safety procedures. 
 
Safety knowledge (foreman-reported; items 1-4, Griffin & Neal, 2000; items 5 and 6, 
added by the participating organization) 
(1-5 scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) 
1. This employee knows how to perform his/her job in a safe manner. 
2. This employee knows how to use safety equipment and standard work procedures. 
3. This employee knows how to maintain or improve workplace health and safety. 
4. This employee knows how to reduce the risk of accidents and incidents in the 
workplace. 
5. This employee knows which safety requirements apply to his/her work. 
6. This employee knows where to find company safety procedures. 
 
Safety locus of control (Jones & Wuebker, 1985; items 1-6, safety internality; items 7-
12, safety externality; items 13-15, powerful others – not incorporated in analyses) 
(1-5 scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”) 
1. Industrial accidents are due to employee carelessness. 
2. Most on-the-job accidents and injuries result from employees’ mistakes. 
3. Most accidents are avoidable. 
4. Most accidents and injuries at work can be avoided. 
5. Occupational accidents and injuries occur because employees do not take enough 
interest in safety. 
6. Most of my accidental injuries are preventable. 
7. I think I am a victim of misfortune whenever I have an accident. 
8. No matter how hard employees try to prevent them, there will always be on-the-job 
accidents. 
9. For me avoiding accidents is a matter of luck. 
10. There are so many dangers in this world that I never know how or when I might be 
in an accident. 
11. With my luck, I will probably have an accident in the near future. 
12. The odds are in favor of me having an accident in the near future. 
13. Industrial accidents are usually caused by unsafe equipment and poor safety 
regulations. 
14. Most on-the-job accidents can be blamed on poor management. 
15. It is the company's responsibility to prevent all accidents at work. 
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Safety participation (self-reported; 1-4, Griffin & Neal, 2000; item 5 was added by the 
participating organization – this item was not included for this study’s analyses) 
(1-5 scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) 
1. I promote the safety program within the organization. 
2. I put in extra effort to improve the safety of the workplace. 
3. I help my coworkers when they are working under risky or hazardous conditions. 
4. I voluntarily carry out tasks or activities that help to improve workplace safety. 
5. I am comfortable stopping a work task if I see unsafe acts or risky operations. 
 
Safety participation (foreman-reported; 1-4, Griffin & Neal, 2000; item 5 was added by 
the participating organization – this item was not included for this study’s analyses) 
(1-5 scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) 
1. This employee promotes the safety program within the organization. 
2. This employee puts in extra effort to improve the safety of the workplace. 
3. This employee helps his/her coworkers when they are working under risky or 
hazardous conditions. 
4. This employee voluntarily carries out tasks or activities that help to improve 
workplace safety. 
5. This employee is comfortable stopping a work task if s/he sees unsafe acts or risky 
operations. 
 
Safety threshold (created for this study) 
(1-5 scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) 
1. It is important for me to feel safe at work. 
2. I need to feel safe to do my best at work. 
3. When working, it is critical to feel safe. 
 
Safety-related anxiety (Marteau & Bekker’s [1992] short version of Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, & Lushene’s [1970] State-Trait Anxiety Inventory [STAI]) 
(Instructions specified for respondents to indicate the extent to which the following 
statements are generally true of them with regard to their safety at work; 1-4 scale with 
anchors corresponding to “Not at all,” “Somewhat,” “Moderately,” and “Very much,” 
respectively) 
1. I feel calm. (R) 
2. I am tense. 
3. I feel upset. 
4. I am relaxed. (R) 
5. I feel content. (R) 
6. I am worried. 
 
Trait anxiety (IPIP representation of Costa & McCrae’s [1992] NEO-PI-R anxiety 
facet; Instructions asked respondents to describe how accurately the statements below 
described them using a 1-5 scale with anchors corresponding to “Very inaccurate,” 
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“Moderately inaccurate,” Neither inaccurate nor accurate,” “Moderately accurate,” and 
“Very accurate,” respectively) 
1. Worry about things. 
2. Fear for the worst. 
3. Am afraid of many things. 
4. Get stressed out easily. 
5. Get caught up in my problems. 
6. Am not easily bothered by things. (R) 
7. Am relaxed most of the time. (R) 
8. Am not easily disturbed by events. (R) 
9. Don’t worry about things that have already happened. (R) 
10. Adapt easily to new situations. (R) 
 
  
1
1
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APPENDIX C 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND VARIABLE INTER-CORRELATIONS FOR ALL 3 PARTICIPATING SITES 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Psychological safety climate 3.81 0.62 (.88)         
2. Trait anxiety 2.49 0.65 -.20* (.81)        
3. Dutifulness 4.26 0.64 .34* -.20* (.92)       
4. Impression management 3.87 0.66 .22* -.20* .50* (.62)      
5. Safety knowledge 4.34 0.50 .41* -.22* .40* .26* (.78)     
6. Job risk 2.88 0.99 -.02 .09* -.04 -.05 .09* (.73)    
7. Safety threshold 4.26 0.69 .25* -.02 .33* .22* .30* .11* (.84)   
8. Internal locus of control 3.75 0.65 .13* -.01 .25* .15* .18* .03 .22* (.84)  
9. External locus of control 2.58 0.61 -.14* .33* -.22* -.18* -.12* .19* -.05 -.10* (.73) 
10. Perceived safety  3.96 0.66 .38* -.23* .25* .17* .24* -.26* .15* .25* -.21* 
11. Safety anxiety 1.57 0.50 -.26* .42* -.14* -.13* -.16* .23* .00 -.05 .29* 
12. Job satisfaction 5.05 1.14 .32* -.30* .30* .27* .21* -.10* .24* .21* -.17* 
13. Life satisfaction 4.87 1.14 .27* -.30* .25* .23* .13* -.11* .16* .14* -.14* 
14. Psychological contract 
fulfillment 
4.09 0.66 .55* -.18* .35* .14* .24* -.16* .19* .22* -.29* 
15. Safety compliance  4.34 0.59 .50* -.17* .51* .29* .54* -.01 .33* .27* -.23* 
16. Safety participation 4.08 0.64 .46* -.12* .33* .23* .43* .14* .25* .25* -.16* 
17. Knowledge of injuries 3.03 7.60 -.12* -.02 -.12* -.03 .03 .10* -.11* -.11* .07 
18. Experienced injuries 0.34 1.19 -.04 .03 -.07 .02 .04 .14* -.03 -.15* .13* 
19. Witnessed injuries 0.63 2.57 -.08 -.01 -.08 .00 .00 .05 -.06 -.05 .01 
20. Learned injuries 2.12 5.21 -.13* -.03 -.13* -.05 .03 .09* -.12* -.10* .06 
 
Notes. These numbers are based on 595 employee responses across all 3 participating sites. Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are coefficient 
alphas; N = 75 for foremen-rated variables. *p ≤ .05, two-tailed. 
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APPENDIX C continued… 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
21. Age 41.97 4.73 -.07 .10* .04 .07 .12* .06 .10* -.01 .04 
22. Job experience 14.79 12.52 -.08 .10* -.07 .00 .10 .00 .04 .00 .05 
23. Tenure 7.55 9.21 -.07 .10* -.11* .03 .05 .07 .01 -.06 .12* 
24. Hours worked per week 41.79 4.73 .06 -.02 .02 .02 .03 .00 -.08 .00 -.07 
Foremen-rated variables            
25. Opportunity to observe 4.16 0.87 .03 -.09 .22 .00 .06 .08 .21 -.01 .13 
26. Safety knowledge 4.40 0.58 .00 -.02 .07 -.07 -.06 .14 .10 .03 .03 
27. Safety compliance 4.45 0.56 .07 -.08 .18 .01 -.02 .14 .18 .01 .01 
28. Safety participation  4.16 0.65 -.10 .07 .04 -.08 -.10 .10 .06 .01 .10 
 
Notes. These numbers are based on 595 employee responses across all 3 participating sites. Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are coefficient 
alphas; N = 75 for foremen-rated variables. *p ≤ .05, two-tailed. 
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APPENDIX C continued… 
Variable M SD 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
10. Perceived safety 3.96 0.66 (.90)         
11. Safety anxiety 1.57 0.50 -.36* (.80)        
12. Job satisfaction 5.05 1.14 .31* -.34* (.87)       
13. Life satisfaction 4.87 1.14 .31* -.37* .58* (.86)      
14. Psychological contract 
fulfillment 
4.09 0.66 .56* -.37* .33* .33* (.83)     
15. Safety compliance 4.34 0.59 .40* -.26* .38* .28* .56* (.92)    
16. Safety participation 4.08 0.64 .25* -.12* .25* .18* .39* .62* (.86)   
17. Knowledge of injuries 3.03 7.60 -.14* .17* -.15* -.13* -.17* -.10* -.09 --  
18. Experienced injuries 0.34 1.19 -.13* .23* -.14* -.12* -.14* -.09* -.05 .46* -- 
19. Witnessed injuries 0.63 2.57 -.07 .08 -.08 -.07 -.14* -.05 -.03 .80* .21* 
20. Learned injuries 2.12 5.21 -.13* .14* -.13* -.12* -.15* -.09* -.10* .95* .34* 
21. Age 41.97 4.73 -.08 .16* .11* -.03 -.07 .04 .08 .15* .21* 
22. Job experience 14.79 12.52 -.09* .15* .06 -.07 -.11* -.01 .05 .22* .24* 
23. Tenure 7.55 9.21 -.09* .13* .01 -.06 -.15* -.07 -.02 .30* .32* 
24. Hours worked per week 41.79 4.73 .02 -.05 .06 .01 .06 .03 .07 -.01 -.08 
Foremen-rated variables            
25. Opportunity to observe 4.16 0.87 .14 .00 .00 -.04 .02 -.04 .16 .10 .01 
26. Safety knowledge 4.40 0.58 .20 -.11 .09 .03 .12 .02 .25* .08 .05 
27. Safety compliance 4.45 0.56 .19 -.11 .09 .11 .14 .05 .22 .01 -.07 
28. Safety participation 4.16 0.65 .15 -.09 .03 -.08 .13 -.05 .08 .09 .04 
 
Notes. These numbers are based on 595 employee responses across all 3 participating sites. Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are coefficient 
alphas; N = 75 for foremen-rated variables. *p ≤ .05, two-tailed. 
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APPENDIX C continued… 
Variable M SD 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
19. Witnessed injuries .63 2.57 --          
20. Learned injuries  2.12 5.21 .61* --         
21. Age 41.97 4.73 .12* .12* --        
22. Job experience 14.79 12.52 .18* .18* .76* --       
23. Tenure 7.55 9.21 .23* .25* .55* .65* --      
24. Hours worked per week  41.79 4.73 -.02 .01 .03 .11* .01 --     
Foremen-rated variables             
25. Opportunity to observe 4.16 0.87 .13 .05 -.04 -.04 -.03 .28* --    
26. Safety knowledge 4.40 0.58 .12 .01 -.02 -.02 -.01 .23 .78* (.95)   
27. Safety compliance 4.45 0.56 .06 -.01 -.10 -.09 -.13 .14 .74* .83* (.94)  
28. Safety participation  4.16 0.65 .14 .02 -.04 -.07 .00 .24* .64* .83* .65* (.87) 
 
Notes. These numbers are based on 595 employee responses across all 3 participating sites; Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are coefficient 
alphas; N = 75 for foremen-rated variables. *p ≤ .05, two-tailed.
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Notes. Structural model results for all three sites combined (N = 508). Solid lines reflect hypothesized paths whereas dashed 
lines reflect non-hypothesized parameters; all estimates are standardized; standard errors were adjusted to account for 
employee nesting within sites. Results for model fit: χ2(3,698) = 8,198.67, CFI = .84, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .10. *p ≤ .05.
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APPENDIX E 
SAFETY-RELATED ANXIETY PREDICTING FOREMAN-RATED EMPLOYEE 
SAFETY BEHAVIORS FOR THE FULL SAMPLE  
 
Variable Safety compliance Safety participation 
Psychological safety climate .09 -.18 
Safety knowledge -.05 -.13* 
Safety-related anxiety -.14 -.06 
 
Notes. N = 595 (dependent variables N = 75). All table entries represent standardized estimates. Because 
these data were nested within three sites, standard errors were adjusted to reflect data non-independence. *p 
≤ .05. 
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APPENDIX F 
PAPER-BASED SURVEY ADMINISTERED TO EMPLOYEES
7
 
 
SAFETY SURVEY 
 
Please carefully read through all of these instructions before starting this survey. The purpose of this survey is to assess a 
number of safety-related individual and workplace variables to help evaluate the safety level of your workplace. This study is 
being conducted by a team of researchers from Texas A&M University with the support of  management.  
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this first page is to provide you (as a prospective research study participant) information that may affect your 
decision as to whether or not to participate in this research. You have been asked to participate in a research study examining 
employees’ safety perceptions in the workplace. You were selected to be a possible participant because you are a  
 employee.  
 
What will I be asked to do? If you agree to participate, you will be asked to complete a survey which will take 
approximately 20 minutes to complete.  
 
What are the risks involved in this study? The risks associated with this study are minimal and are not greater than the risks 
ordinarily encountered in daily life.  
 
What are the possible benefits of this study?  
The benefits you will receive by participating in this study include increased voice to your safety concerns and an enhanced 
understanding by the leadership teams on how safety in the workplace can be improved.  
 
Do I have to participate?  No. Your participation is voluntary. You may decide not to participate or to withdraw at any time 
without your current or future relations with  being affected.  
                                                 
7
 While the content of the survey is exactly the same as what was delivered to participants, the formatting has been altered to fit in this document. 
Specifically, the margins and some of the font sizes have been adjusted to fit content on these pages. The identity of the participating organization is 
being protected in accordance with a signed confidentiality statement. 
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Who will know about my participation in this research study?  
All responses to this survey will be STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL—individual responses will NOT be published in any form 
or provided to  representatives. To preserve confidentiality, the responses gathered in this study will only be 
analyzed by Texas A&M researchers and presented in aggregate form in all reports summarizing the findings. Information 
about you will be kept confidential to the extent permitted or required by law. 
 
Whom do I contact with questions about the research?  
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact Jeremy Beus at (979) 862-8410 or jbeus@neo.tamu.edu or  
  
 
Whom do I contact about my rights as a research participant? 
This research study has been reviewed by the Human Subjects’ Protection Program and/or the Institutional Review Board at 
Texas A&M University. For research-related problems or questions regarding your rights as a research participant, you can 
contact these offices at (979) 458-4067 or irb@tamu.edu.  
 
Participation.  Please be sure you have read the above information, asked questions and received answers to your 
satisfaction.  
 
Repetitive Questions 
As you proceed through this survey you will note that many of the questions are highly similar. This was done intentionally. 
Please respond to each question honestly and to the best of your knowledge. 
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Definition of a Workgroup and Supervisor 
For the purposes of this survey, a workgroup is defined as a group of employees who report to a common supervisor. Your 
supervisor is the person you directly report to (supervisor, manager, etc.), even if he/she is not referred to as a “supervisor.” 
Related to this,  
 
How many employees are in your current workgroup (including yourself, your supervisor, and the other workers who 
report to the same supervisor)?  
 
_________  employees 
 
SAFETY CLIMATE/CULTURE QUESTIONS 
Thinking of your current workgroup, please read the 
statements listed below and mark the response that indicates 
the extent to which you agree with each statement. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. My supervisor strictly enforces the safe working procedures in 
my workgroup. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. My supervisor takes a proactive stance when it comes to 
safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. My supervisor demonstrates leadership by keeping people 
focused on safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. My supervisor takes the lead on safety issues. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. My supervisor is committed to improving safety. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. My supervisor places a strong emphasis on workplace health 
and safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Safety problems are openly discussed between my supervisor 
and my workgroup.  
1 2 3 4 5 
8. My workgroup gets timely feedback on safety issues we have 
raised with our supervisor. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Thinking of your current workgroup, please read the 
statements listed below and mark the response that indicates 
the extent to which you agree with each statement. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
9. My supervisor keeps my workgroup informed of safety rules. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Changes in procedures and their effects on safety are 
effectively communicated by my supervisor. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. There is adequate safety training in my workgroup. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. My supervisor provides safety training when employees 
change work tasks. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. My supervisor invests a lot of time in employee safety 
training. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. My supervisor trains employees to be safe. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. My co-workers always follow safety procedures. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. My co-workers are quick to point out unsafe conditions. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. My co-workers take safety very seriously. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. My co-workers are committed to safety improvement. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. My supervisor provides sufficient safety equipment for 
employees. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. My supervisor provides safe working conditions. 1 2 3 4 5 
21. My supervisor checks equipment to make sure it is free of 
faults. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. Unsafe conditions are promptly corrected in my work area. 1 2 3 4 5 
23. My supervisor consults with employees regularly about 
workplace health and safety issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. My supervisor promotes employees’ involvement in safety 
related matters. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Thinking of your current workgroup, please read the 
statements listed below and mark the response that indicates 
the extent to which you agree with each statement. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
25. My supervisor values employees’ ideas about improving 
safety and health. 
1 2 3 4 5 
26. My supervisor encourages employees to become involved in 
safety matters. 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. The reward system in my workgroup promotes high 
performance only when work is conducted safely. 
1 2 3 4 5 
28. My supervisor rewards safe behaviors. 1 2 3 4 5 
29. My supervisor praises safe work behavior. 1 2 3 4 5 
30. In my workgroup, employees who work safely get 
recognition. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
PERSONALITY QUESTIONS 
Read the following statements and indicate the 
extent to which each accurately describes you. 
 
Very 
Inaccurate 
Moderately 
Inaccurate 
Neither 
Accurate nor 
Inaccurate 
Moderately 
Accurate 
Very 
Accurate 
1. I worry about things. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I fear for the worst. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I am afraid of many things. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I get stressed out easily. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I get caught up in my problems. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. I am not easily bothered by things. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. I am relaxed most of the time.  1 2 3 4 5 
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8. I am not easily disturbed by events.  1 2 3 4 5 
9. I don’t worry about things that have already 
happened. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I adapt easily to new situations.  1 2 3 4 5 
11. I believe laws should be strictly enforced. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. I try to follow the rules. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I respect authority. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. I stick to the rules. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. I do things by the book. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. I follow directions. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. I believe there is never an excuse for lying.  1 2 3 4 5 
18. I always admit it when I make a mistake.  1 2 3 4 5 
19. I rarely overindulge. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. I have sometimes had to tell a lie. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
  
  
 
1
2
3 
SAFETY ATTITUDES/PERCEPTIONS QUESTIONS 
Please mark the response that indicates the extent to which 
you agree with each statement. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. I know how to perform my job in a safe manner. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I know how to use safety equipment and standard work 
procedures. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I know how to maintain or improve workplace health and 
safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I know how to reduce the risk of accidents and incidents in 
the workplace. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I know which safety requirements apply to my work. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. I know where to find company safety procedures. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. I encounter personally hazardous situations while at work. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. My job is physically dangerous. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. I am directly exposed to safety risks in carrying out my job. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. It is important for me to feel safe at work. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. I need to feel safe to do my best at work. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. When working, it is critical to feel safe. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Industrial accidents are due to employee carelessness. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Most on-the-job accidents and injuries result from 
employees’ mistakes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Most accidents are avoidable. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Most accidents and injuries at work can be avoided. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Occupational accidents and injuries occur because 
employees do not take enough interest in safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please mark the response that indicates the extent to which 
you agree with each statement. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
18. Most of my accidental injuries are preventable. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. I think I am a victim of misfortune whenever I have an 
accident. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. No matter how hard employees try to prevent them, there 
will always be on-the-job accidents. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. For me, avoiding accidents is a matter of luck. 1 2 3 4 5 
22. There are so many dangers in this world that I never know 
how or when I might be in an accident. 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. With my luck, I will probably have an accident in the near 
future. 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. The odds are in favor of me having an accident in the near 
future. 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. Industrial accidents are usually caused by unsafe equipment 
and poor safety regulations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
26. Most on-the-job accidents can be blamed on poor 
management. 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. It is the company’s responsibility to prevent all accidents at 
work. 
1 2 3 4 5 
28. I feel safe at my workplace. 1 2 3 4 5 
29. I do not worry about being injured when I am at work. 1 2 3 4 5 
30. My need for safety is fulfilled at work. 1 2 3 4 5 
31. I am confident that I am safe when I am at work. 1 2 3 4 5 
32. I feel that I am free from harm at my workplace. 1 2 3 4 5 
33. At work, my need for safety is satisfied. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Please indicate the extent to which the following 
statements are true with regard to your safety at work. 
 
Not at all Somewhat Moderately Very much 
1. I feel calm. 1 2 3 4 
2. I am tense. 1 2 3 4 
3. I feel upset. 1 2 3 4 
4. I am relaxed. 1 2 3 4 
5. I feel content. 1 2 3 4 
6. I am worried. 1 2 3 4 
Please mark the response that indicates the extent 
to which you agree with each statement. Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewh
at 
Disagree 
Neither 
Disagree 
nor 
Agree 
Somewh
at Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. I find real enjoyment in my job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I like my job better than the average person. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I am seldom bored with my job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I would not consider taking another kind of job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Most days I am enthusiastic about my job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I feel fairly well satisfied with my job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. In most ways my life is close to ideal. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. The conditions of my life are excellent. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I am satisfied with my life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. So far I have gotten the important things I want 
in life. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. If I could live my life over, I would change 
almost nothing. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Please mark the response that indicates the extent to which 
you agree with each statement. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. My employer has kept its promise to uphold workplace 
safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I feel that my employer has come through in fulfilling its 
responsibility to provide a safe working environment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. My employer has failed in its obligation to provide a safe 
working environment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. So far my employer has done an excellent job of meeting 
its obligation to ensure a safe workplace. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I carry out my work in a safe manner. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. I use all the necessary safety equipment to do my job. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. I use all the correct safety procedures for carrying out my 
job. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I ensure the highest levels of safety when I carry out my 
job. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I promote the safety program within the organization. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. I put in extra effort to improve the safety of the 
workplace. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I help my co-workers when they are working under risky 
or hazardous conditions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I voluntarily carry out tasks or activities that help to 
improve workplace safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. I am comfortable stopping a work task if I see unsafe acts 
or risky operations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Please proceed to the next page to complete a brief Demographics section 
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DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS  
 
As noted, all responses to this survey will be STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. We ask that you please provide your employee 
identification number in the space provided below to allow Texas A&M researchers to combine responses to certain work 
groups. All responses will be securely stored by the Texas A&M researchers and will only be analyzed and presented in 
aggregate form such that individual responses cannot be identified.  
 
1. Employee Identification Number:   ___________ 
 
2. Age:   ______ years 
 
3. Sex:    Male        Female   (circle one) 
 
4. Approximately how many years of work experience do you have in your career/field?    _____ years 
 
5. How long have you worked in your current job?  _____ years 
 
6. On average, how many hours do you work per week in this job?   ______ hours 
 
7. Do you currently hold a supervisory or managerial position in this job?    Yes No    (circle one) 
 
8. If yes, how many people do you supervise?  ______ people 
 
9. How many times have you been injured in this job? _________ 
 
10. How many times have you personally witnessed a co-worker get injured in this job? _________   
 
11. How many co-worker injuries have you learned about in this job that you did not personally witness?    ___________ 
  
 
1
2
8 
Instructions: The diagram below illustrates several workflow patterns. Please read the description for each illustration and 
answer the question below considering the workflow pattern in your current workgroup. 
 
Which of the illustrations below best characterizes the way that work flows between members of your workgroup in order to 
successfully perform your job?    ________  (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) 
 
          Thank you for completing this survey
129 
 
 
 
APPENDIX G 
COMPUTER-BASED SURVEY ADMINISTERED TO FOREMEN
8
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
8
 Survey content has been pasted from the online survey into this document. Because of this there have 
been some minor formatting changes. The identity of the participating organization is being protected in 
accordance with a signed confidentiality statement. Skip logic embedded in the online survey allowed 
foremen the opportunity to rate from 1 to 20 employees on the set of items listed below. If they answered 
“No” to question 3 “Do you have another employee to rate?”, they were directed to the demographics page. 
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